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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the history of events in Rhode Island connected to the
1934 General Textile Strike. During the strike, two people were killed by soldiers of
the Rhode Island National Guard in an event known as “The Saylesville Massacre.”
The established historiography of the 1934 General Textile Strike does not tell the
story of the Saylesville Massacre well. Despite claims to the contrary, the strike was
poorly run and lost by the union. Through a careful reading of primary sources this
thesis argues that only by understanding the 1934 General Textile Strike as a loss for
the union can both Labor History and the Labor Movement learn from its example.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1934, the United Textile Workers of America (UTW) began a
nationwide strike against the American cotton textile industry. More than 500,000
workers walked off the job, making the 22-day long strike one of the largest labor
actions in American history. While national in scale the bulk of the workers impacted
were in the American South, New England, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.1 During
the strike in Rhode Island violent clashes between workers and security forces resulted
in four deaths. In the small textile village of Saylesville, Rhode Island, confrontations
between neighborhood residents, area workers, and security forces led to a week-long
street battle resulting in dozens of arrests, the wounding of scores, and the deaths of
two men - Charles Gorcynski and William Blackwood - in an incident known in
Rhode Island labor lore as “The Saylesville Massacre.”
The historiography of the 1934 textile workers strike includes references to the
confrontations in Saylesville, particularly during the peak of the action between
September 7 and September 12, but the Saylesville Massacre is not explored in great
depth. Most scholars properly catalogue the incident as one of the most violent of the
strike but because the Saylesville Massacre is one of many violent incidents in a
national strike, not enough detail is provided to properly explain why Saylesville
turned so viciously violent. This thesis seeks to remedy this historiographical gap.
After introductory remarks providing historical background about the village of
Saylesville and factory at the center of the story, this thesis will explore the national
circumstances prompting the strike. The thesis will describe the union leading the
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John A. Salmond, The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama (Columbia: University
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1

strike along with the men leading the union. My attention will then shift towards the
events of the strike in Rhode Island.
In a way it is understandable not much is known about the Saylesville
Massacre. The key primary source about the strike in Rhode Island is the state’s daily
newspaper, The Providence Journal. The newspaper is known for its anti-union
animus and during the strike its slanted coverage of the events is clear. But the
newspaper’s more direct impact on the record are the poorly written and badly edited
stories about the strike. While it may be understandable a newspaper trying to publish
up-to-the-minute accounts of the movements of thousands of people would sacrifice
complete accuracy for the sake of current information, the newspapers stories written
during the actual events are nearly incoherent. Stories beginning with the events of
one day make unexplained, non-linear leaps to other days or other times within the
same day. Researchers looking broadly at the events of the strike can be forgiven for
not being able to put the pieces of the puzzle together.
Another reason for the lack of scholarly attention on the Saylesville Massacre
could also be the lack of records with the union at the center of the story – the UTW.
Textile unions never enjoyed significant density in Rhode Island and while the UTW
claimed at the time of the strike to have over 50 local unions in the state, most of them
appear to be very small. Also, in the years just after the strike, the UTW was torn apart
in the battles between the American Federation of Labor and the newly formed
Congress of Industrial Organizations. The small organization became smaller through
civil war.
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But these barriers are not the real reason why the Saylesville Massacre is
nearly forgotten and misremembered in labor history. My thesis is the strike in Rhode
Island was disorganized and poorly run and directly contributed to the deaths in the
Saylesville Massacre. The year 1934 saw several massive strikes around the country,
many of them resulting in significant victories for the working class, but the national
textile strike was lost by the union and its members. In Rhode Island, the strike was
an embarrassment to the labor movement and to Governor Theodore Francis “TF”
Green, a Democrat and supporter of the New Deal. For both the labor movement and
the governor to continue their path to political power in the state, the facts of the
textile strike and the events in Saylesville needed to be swept aside; so, they were.
This thesis presents three arguments. First, the established historiography has
not told the story of the Saylesville Massacre or the events of 1934 textile strike in
Rhode Island particularly well. By accepting the union’s declaration of victory at the
conclusion of the strike scholars have ignored some obvious facts about the union’s
ineffective conduct of the strike. The UTW was woefully unprepared to engage in a
strike of this magnitude. They had neither the staff nor the financial resources to
confront a complicated industry on a national scale. The union’s track record in major
confrontations was abysmal and they did not demonstrate any meaningful steps to
prepare for the national strike. Despite claims by some that the union was well
organized in Rhode Island, I will show that it was not. The disorganization contributed
to the tragedy on the streets of Saylesville.
Secondly, the strike was a loss, and Labor History as a discipline should
approach the subject from that perspective. Scholars like John Salmond, Janet Irons
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and Cletus Daniel, discussed below, do an admirable job of explaining the deficits of
the UTW, but more research is required to understand the impact of the loss of the
strike. One area for future scholars to consider is how the defeat of the textile strike
impacted southern workers attitudes towards unionizing for generations to come. Did
the failure of the union to adequately support the striking workers contribute to the
failure of subsequent organizing efforts in the South? Yes is a reasonable answer but
to explore this hypothesis, one must first approach the strike as lost by the union. That
means challenging the union’s claims which, at least in the Rhode Island context, I do
below.
Finally, it is important for the labor movement to accept the 1934 textile strike
as a loss to learn from its mistakes. The historiography of 1934 details a huge upswing
in working-class activism, the roots of which are explored below. However, given the
union organizing victories of that year, it is tempting to either shunt aside the details of
the textile strike and the ineptitude of the union leading it, or worse, drift into
hagiography about the year “labor erupted.” Leading working women and men out of
their workplace and onto the picket lines is potentially putting workers in harm’s way.
It is not a decision to be taken lightly and holding up the Saylesville Massacre as a
cautionary tale can help instruct union organizers on factors they need to take into
consideration before launching a strike. Perhaps the primary factory for consideration
when calling a strike is the strength of the union as an organization, not just as an idea.
Strikes, and standing up to the boss, the cops, and the military can be thrilling and a
great way to build working class solidarity…until the shooting starts.

4

The UTW never should have called the national textile strike of 1934. They
were bullied into the action by a rank-and-file justifiably angry at their mistreatment in
the workplace but who did not adequately appreciate the task before them. The Union
knew they were not ready, but they forged ahead anyway, and in Saylesville, two
workers were killed as a result. The UTW members, most of whom joined the union
only months before the strike was announced, also bear some responsibility for the
strike’s failure. Not because they lacked resolve or a sense of solidarity - both were
clearly on display - but because no matter how strong one’s sense of union
comradeship is felt, it will not stop the effects of tear gas in the lungs or bullet wounds
to the head.

5

BACKGROUND
Saylesville is one of hundreds of former mill villages dotting industrial New
England. Nestled in between Rhode Island rural highway routes 122 and 126, the
village is one of the six in the town of Lincoln, five miles north of Providence, and
bordering the city of Central Falls.2 Originally known as “World’s End,” the village
officially became Saylesville in 1881 when Samuel Fessenden was assigned
postmaster to the newly opened post office to serve the community of workers and
managers of the expanding bleachery business of brothers William F. and Frederick C.
Sayles. By the time of the naming of Saylesville, the W.F. & F.C. Sayles Co. was the
largest bleachery company in the world.3
In 1934, the bleachery at the heart of the village was called the Sayles
Finishing Plant. At the time, bleacheries were a crucial link in the textile industry
supply chain, processing raw cotton to make it clean and white. Bleaching textiles in
the early twentieth century was still an ancient, somewhat occult, trade. One writer
describes the process as ‘surrounded by such an aura of mystery’ with routines passed
from father to son like secret recipes.4 Made modern in the eighteenth century with the
introduction of chemicals such as chlorine, the process retained many ancient
characteristics. For example, a critical step in the process is known as ‘souring.’ In
the early twentieth century souring involved treating boiled cotton with a chlorinebased mixture known as ‘chemic’ but in earlier times “souring” was accomplished by
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washing boiled cotton through buttermilk.5 It is easy to imagine the inside of the
bleachery looking like an industrial scale mad scientist laboratory complete with
bubbling cauldrons, jets of water and steam, chutes, box folders, and dripping, stinking
rolls of cotton hanging from rafters above the heads of workers using large wooden
sticks to stir treated fabric through caustic pots of soapy solution. The odors of sugar,
chlorine, and burnt vegetables waft through the air, letting everyone in the factory, and
the surrounding neighborhood, know exactly what step of the process was underway.6
Working at the bleachery was tough, smelly labor and tensions periodically
boiled over into conflict. In the fall of 1905, the Saylesville workers went on strike for
better pay. The strike began in the folding room of the plant after workers, paid $10
per week, demanded a ten-percent pay increase. The workers were angry with the
company for hiring Henry Laurence Gantt, an expert in so-called Scientific
Management. Gantt was recommended to bleachery management by Frederick Taylor,
the founder of Scientific Management as someone who could transform Sayles’
company from a collection of foreman-led fiefdoms into a modern enterprise.
According to Gantt’s biographer L.P. Alford, the workers chafed at Gantt’s methods
and in late October, 1905, the rise in tensions prompted a walkout.7 Strikes against
Scientific Management were common in the early twentieth century, as Hugh Aitken
points out in Scientific Management in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal,
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1908-1915 about a similar strike in 1911, in Watertown, Massachusetts.8 A 1905
trade publication, American Wool & Cotton Reporter, wrote that after several weeks
of the strike the workers “profess to have no fear of the results” and on November 17,
The Boston Daily Globe reported the workers won their all of their demands, including
a reduction from 60 to 58 weekly working hours without loss of pay.9
Seventeen years later a statewide strike of Rhode Island textile factory hands
started when factory owners announced a statewide 20-percent wage cut. Area textile
workers, mostly without formal union support, spontaneously abandoned their looms
and walked off the job. On February 4, over a thousand workers marched three miles
from the neighboring city of Pawtucket to Saylesville, hoping to parade in front of the
bleachery. Several inches of freshly fallen snow did not stop the marchers, but reports
vary about their reception when they arrived in Saylesville. Susan Jaffee tells us in
her master’s thesis “Ethnic Working Class Protest: The Textile Strike of 1922 in
Rhode Island” how local media reported one hundred of the Saylesville workers
joined the pickets while the UTW, which had a small loom fixers local at the plant,
claimed 500-600 workers joined in.10 Despite the divergent numbers, at least for a
time the bleachery was closed.
The national conditions leading up to the textile strike of 1934 are
extensively discussed in scholarly works like The Turbulent Years: A History of the
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Hugh G.J. Aitken, Scientific Management in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 1908-1915.
Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/34265.
9
No author, “untitled,” American Wool and Cotton Reporter, Vol. XIX, No. 45, (Boston, New York, &
Philadelphia), November 16, 1905, 9. "Saylesville Hands Return." The Boston Daily Globe, November
18, 1905.
10
J Susan E. Jaffe "Ethnic Working Class Protest: The Textile Strike of 1922 in Rhode Island,”
(master’s thesis, Brown University, 1974.)

8

American Worker, 1933-1940, by Irving Bernstein; Testing the New Deal: The
General Textile Strike of 1934 in the American South, by Janet Irons; Culture of
Misfortune: An Interpretive History of Textile Unionism in the United States by Cletus
Daniel, and The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama, by John
Salmond.11 The consensus in the literature about the national textile strike of 1934 is
the hopes of workers to find relief from the depravations of the Great Depression by
organizing unions, as envisioned in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 were
dashed by stiff employer opposition. Only a strike on a national scale could possible
address this injustice.
A key provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act was Section 7(a),
which for the first time in American legislative history gave the federal government’s
legal support to union organizing. The section read in part:
…employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in the selforganization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.12
However, even though Section 7(a) played a role in sparking workers' interests in
union organizing, the law was quickly viewed by workers as a ‘broken promise’ given
how hard employers fought back against union organizing efforts. As a result,
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Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1940 (Chicago,
Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2010). Janet Christine Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile
Strike of 1934 in the American South (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000). Cletus
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(Ithaca: ILR Press, 2001).
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of Missouri Press, 2002).
12
Bernstein, 34.

9

Bernstein tells us, “In 1934, labor erupted.” The year was marked by over 1,800
strikes involving almost a million and a half workers across the country.13
The Turbulent Years is a long and comprehensive review of the ebbs and flows
of worker organizing during the first eight years following the initial inauguration of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President of the United States on March 4, 1933. The
book offers a comprehensive review of the other key strikes of 1934, including the
Toledo Auto-Lite strike, the Minneapolis Teamster strike, and the West Coast
Longshoremen strikes. He rightly includes the national textile strike led by the UTW
as one of the key events in this year of heavy strike activity, explaining the strike was
prompted by textile manufacturers deliberately undermining the spirit and intent of
Section 7(a).
Interestingly, Daniel’s Culture of Misfortune claims that while Section 7(a)
was indeed a turning point for organized labor’s ambitions to organize on a large
scale, it was considered a throw-away, last minute addition to the bill during drafting
and the legislation’s sponsors did not conceive it would lead to massive organizing of
the depression era proletariat.14 Daniel’s book discusses elements of the 1934 strike,
but its major subject is the UTW itself, an organization he describes as having an
“unfortunate genius for self-destruction.” Daniel’s comprehensive understanding of
the UTW is critical to explaining their role in leading the textile strike, especially their
“Ox-cart tactics in an automobile age.”15 It is a point seconded by Richard Kelly in
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his book Nine Lives For Labor where he characterizes the UTW as “born in debt and
died in bankruptcy.”16
Irons’ Testing the New Deal takes an equally dim view of the UTW. Her book
documents the various factions tugging at the union and its leadership, but critically,
locates the national strike in the context of a northern based union with an increasingly
large and restive southern membership. Meticulously documented and supplemented
with personal interviews of southern strike survivors, Irons’ work focuses specifically
on the southern worker experience of the New Deal through the activity of the national
textile strike. In this way, her book is similar to Lizabeth Cohen’s Making a New
Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 and Elizabeth Faue’s Community of
Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 19151945, both of which study the lived experience of the working class in a particular
geographic area during the New Deal era.17 For Irons, “How southern textile workers
mobilized in response to the New Deal is key to explaining the passion of the ‘34
strike.”18
The strikes of 1934, while thoroughly documented in the historiography,
because of their mostly triumphant results, are susceptible to hagiography. For the
general textile strike, what my analysis shows is in addition to any weaknesses in the
law and its enforcement, the UTW was in no place to be able to lead a strike on a
national scale. Structurally and financially the union did not have the resources nor
16

Richard Kelley, Nine Lives For Labor (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1956), 65.
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, Repr. ed.
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1996). Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men,
and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
1991).
18
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staff to pull off an action of this size, but they tried anyway, and the results were
disastrous. While scholars like Daniel and Irons do point to the weakness of the
UTW, the culpability for the strike’s failure has not sufficiently been explored. In part
what I attempt to do below is build on the work of Daniel and Irons and through the
example of Saylesville, make a connection for the strike’s failure directly to the union.
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PRELUDE TO THE GENERAL TEXTILE STRIKE
United Textile Workers President Thomas McMahon and Vice President
Francis Gorman were both Rhode Islanders. Thomas McMahon was in his mid-sixties
at the time of the strike (he was never sure if he was born in 1870 or 1868). He
emigrated from Ireland as a boy to Rhode Island and worked in textile mills
throughout the state. McMahon joined the Knights of Labors but after the order faded
away he joined the UTW, three years after the union’s founding in 1901. Active in the
union from the day he joined, he worked his way up the leadership ranks, joining the
national executive board in 1906, eventually rising to the presidency in 1921.19
Francis Gorman was about a decade younger than McMahon, emigrating from
England to Rhode Island at the age of 13. He too worked in mills across Rhode Island
before becoming an organizer for the UTW. He was elected national Vice President in
1928, assigned to the role of lead organizer for the UTW’s southern organizing
campaign. The campaign, which the UTW under-resourced financially and
understaffed with experienced organizers, ended in disaster, with several strikes
crushed by the National Guard.20 Janet Irons points out Gorman was not only
frustrated by the power of the southern mill owners, but also with the ‘indifference’
the UTW displayed toward organizing the southern millworkers into the union.21
With Gorman’s failure to organize the southern mill workers, the UTW
languished as the depression grew deeper. Its national membership hovered around
15,000 and it once more teetered on the brink of economic collapse.22 But in 1932,

19

Kelley, 68-69.
Daniel, 37.
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with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the passage of the NIRA, the UTW
was offered a lifeline. The passage of the NIRA created the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) and gave the federal government significant oversight in core
American industries hit hard by the Depression, including textiles. The NIRA
suspended antitrust laws for a period of two years, gave the NRA the ability to set
codes of fair competition within industries, establish minimum wages, and set
maximum hours. One of the first industries to establish a code was textiles.
Even before Congress finalized the NIRA, the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI),
headed by George Sloan, began drafting language for a “Code of Fair Competition.”
The CTI began in 1926 as a voluntary association of textile manufactures attempting
to self-regulate the industry. The organization tried to get the industry to agree to
voluntary production quotas to head off repeated cases of over production which
plagued textile manufacturing for decades. By 1932, CTI was recognized as the
official spokes group for the industry, but early in 1933, Sloan concluded without
government intervention, the industry was too competitive to agree to voluntary selfregulation.23
Within a month of the signing of the NIRA, the textile industry presented to
General Hugh Johnson, the director of the NRA, a draft code of competition.24 In a
nod to liberals in the New Deal Administration, the code banned child labor, long a
scourge of textile manufacturing.25 The code also, despite the industry's public
opposition to unions and collective bargaining, included the organizing rights
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supposedly guaranteed under Section 7(a). The code established a two-tier wage
system for textile workers - $12/week for companies operating in the South and
$13/week for those in the North. It also restricted production to two, forty-hour shifts
per week and a maximum work week of forty-hours per worker. The textile industry
code was the first approved by the NRA and both industry and labor leaders praised
the code as a model of cooperation and some workers declared it represented their
“industrial declaration of independence. 26
General Johnson named George Sloan as the government’s representative and
chair of the textile industry code board. As Sloan began working on implementation,
concerns surfaced because the code made no mention of the ‘stretch-out.’ For
decades, when textile production needs increased, or if manufacturers wanted to
squeeze more profits out of their labor, they increased the workload of mill hands.
While numbers varied from plant-to-plant, a ‘stretch-out’ required a worker originally
assigned to tend five looms to be assigned to ten, possibly more. Not only did the
stretch-out make the work of tending to large, noisy, machines more stressful and
dangerous, it meant the manufacturer would need fewer workers.
When the original NIRA was under consideration, South Carolina
Congressman John Clarence Taylor, himself a former textile worker, proposed an
amendment prohibiting the use of the stretch-out in textile manufacturing. His
amendment passed the House of Representatives but was removed from the final
legislation in the conference committee with the Senate. To placate Taylor, General
Johnson suggested modifying the code, after implementation, to prohibit the stretch-
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Salmond, 30.
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out. The modification, known as Section 15, proposed “no employee of any mill in the
cotton textile industry shall be required to do any work in excess of
practices...prevailing on July 1, 1933, unless such increase is submitted to an approved
by the [new cotton textile industry committee] and by the National Recovery
Administration.” However, Sloan prevailed upon Johnston to delay implementation of
Section 15 until the concerns giving rise to were properly studied, and Johnson agreed.
Janet Irons astutely observes the “debate over Section 15 contained the seeds of a
larger conflict.”27
Johnson created a three-person panel to investigate the stretch-out known as
the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board (CTNIRB) and appointed an
industry linked economist named Robert Bruere its chairperson. The other two people
on the board were an anti-union manufacturer named Benjamin Geer from South
Carolina and George Berry, president of the Printing Pressmen's union from
Tennessee. Berry’s appointment was hardly a victory for textile unions - he was
known as a conservative labor leader who had openly criticized the UTW and textile
workers for their propensity to strike and was skeptical over stretch-out concerns.28
It is important to understand what General Johnson allowed to happen in the
textile industry. He adopted the code of competition crafted by the industry and then
appointed the head of an industry group to oversee the code’s enforcement. He created
a three-person committee to investigate the most serious issue left unresolved by the
code and then stacked the committee with appointees known to be sympathetic to the
concerns of manufacturers. The UTW exerted little influence on the code or its

27
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implementation, and even when they tried, they chose to focus wage and hour issues,
not the stretch-out.29
With the implementation of the code, Sloan predicted an immediate increase in
employment. By September of 1933, he was able to report employment levels had
grown by 150,000. In retrospect, the increased employment seems less connected to
the code itself than a boost in production in anticipation of the implementation of new
taxes on raw materials, including cotton, set to take place in October of 1933 thanks to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.30 Described as a ‘boomlet’ by Irving Bernstein, the
increased production was stealing “production and employment from the future.”31
Additionally, Janet Irons contends Sloan’s committee started counting employment
statistics months before the code was actually implemented, questioning the validity of
attributing increased employment to the code.32
A rapid increase of membership in the UTW also began in 1933 after the
adoption of the code. In early1933, the UTW was paying per capita tax to the AFL on
only 15,000 members.33 By September 1933, membership was at 40,000 and by June
of 1934 they counted 250,000 members.34 The largest increase was in the South,
where local unions seemingly sprang up overnight; so much so that it was hard for the
UTW to keep pace with demand. Daniel quotes one UTW organizer in the saying “the
initial fear of the worker to defy his boss has been to a certain degree allayed by this
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very official-looking pronouncement.”35 In both South and North Carolina there were
enough newly formed local unions that workers could form central labor councils to
coordinate activities. The same was true in Alabama, where six separate locals were
formed in Walker County and more than 2,600 members joined a UTW local in
Huntsville.36
After an initial surge in post-code employment, when the boomlet in
production ended, demand dropped, and prices fell. However, production costs
enforced by the code remained intact, and as a result, employment levels increased
more than 12% and the stretch-out returned to mills, crushing workers with the
increased workload. As thousands of workers were let go at plants around the country,
those that remained were expected to do in eight hours what previously took twelve.
“The jobs are just so bad stretched out,” said one distressed worker. 37.
All worker complaints about job losses and the stretch were referred to the
CTNIRB, which defended the interests of the industry and did next to nothing. Even if
they had wanted to, the CTNIRB never had enough staff and resources to investigate
the claims flooding into the agency. For example, of over 1700 wage and hour claims,
only 96 were even investigated. Section 7(a) complaints about unlawful employer
interference with union organizing, went unanswered or denied, giving employers a
clear signal, they could ignore workers' collective bargaining rights with impunity.
Adding insult to injury, the CTNIRB concluded its investigation of the stretch-out and
concluded the practice was “sound in principle” if poorly implemented in some cases.
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Rather than enact General Johnson’s proposed Section 15, Bruere’s committee
recommended a new Section 17, creating a system of mediation for complaints of
overwork in the stretch-out. Of course, those complaints would be referred to the
CTNIRB for mediation, ensuring they would die in the industry dominated
committee.38
Adding to growing worker dissatisfaction with the NRA and the code, in May
of 1934, Johnson authorized a reduction in work hours from 40 to 30 per week without
increasing compensation making workers whole. Finally, the reticent if not docile
UTW, spurred on by an angry and restless membership, told Johnson unless the
decision was reversed, it would call a national strike. “There won’t be a cotton mill
open in the country in two weeks if this order is carried out,” said the UTW’s Francis
Gorman.39 The industry did not take Gorman’s threat seriously. George Sloan
challenged how many members were paying dues to UTW, telling Bruere to request
an audit of the UTW’s member books, saying “I’ll bet they don’t have 70,000 paid-up
members.” But when Bruere conducted the audit of the UTW membership numbers,
he discovered the union had grown to over 270,000 members.40 Despite its growing
strength, the UTW blinked. After a two-day conference in early June, the UTW
withdrew its strike demand in exchange for an additional representative on the
CTNIRB. The textile industry cheered the result, calling a great victory for the bosses
and defeat for the meddlesome union. To twist the knife even further, Sloan
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convinced Johnson to add an additional management representative to the board for
‘balance.’41
The union members, particularly in the south, were furious the UTW
acquiesced so quickly. On July 16, 1934, 20,000 workers in Huntsville, Alabama,
walked off the job without sanction from the union, shutting 24 mills.42 One worker
told local press UTW President Thomas McMahon had killed the June strike, and
“we’re not going to let him kill this one.”43
With a rank-and-file revolt on their hands, the UTW called an emergency
executive board meeting on July 18 and decided to hold a national convention in New
York City on August 13. At the convention, fifty separate resolutions calling for a
national strike were introduced. One bandaged striking Huntsville, Alabama worker,
Monroe Addock, took the convention floor and harangued the UTW leadership saying
“ I’ve been wounded in the head and shot in the leg, but I am willing to shed my blood
again against the capitalists” to the roar of applause from the floor.44 Socialist Party
Leader Norman Thomas told the assembled delegates theirs was a “fight for justice”
and described General Johnson as “the biggest noise with the least results of any man I
ever heard.”45 When Tom McMahon addressed the members, he told them, “We are
not desirous of creating chaos. I would hate to give my consent to anything like that
(a national strike) unless I was absolutely convinced that it was the only way out.
There is no other way. We will say to the manufacturers: now that we know the
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powers we possess, we will wield it, but we will wied (sic) it intelligently and
reasonably.”46
The convention faced other internal discord. McMahon was forced to tell
delegates the UTW did not have sufficient funds to send any money to any of the local
unions, but regardless of the union’s precarious finances, the convention voted down a
resolution to standardize dues across the country at $1 per member per month. Also,
McMahon faced a leadership challenge from Emil Rieve of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Ironically, Rieve was one of the few voices in the room to urge caution on the
proposed strike authorization resolution. He told the crowd “we ought to bite off just
as much as we can chew and not be swayed by the enthusiasm for a general strike.”47
Despite Rieve’s warning, the UTW members voted overwhelmingly to strike - 561 in
favor, 10 opposed.48 McMahon also persuaded Rieve to drop his leadership challenge
and the convention then re-elected McMahon and his team by acclamation.49
The convention also voted to give the executive committee the authority to set
the strike date but instructed them to only give 12 hours’ notice prior to the strike
commencing.50 McMahon appointed UTW Vice President Francis Gorman,
chairperson of the strike committee. As the convention ended, Gorman laid out the
demands of the coming strike: Better enforcement of the NRA code, especially around
the payment of wages; an ‘adjustment’ to the stretch out; an end to discrimination
against union members, and a 30-hour work week for 40 hours pay.51
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After the UTW convention in August 1934 formally sanctioned the national
strike, Gorman appointed another Rhode Islander, Joseph Sylvia, to lead the strike
committee in New England and Sylvia chose his home state for the base of operations.
There is not much about Sylvia in the record, apart from a few mentions in literature
from the TWUA-CIO, a separate union from the UTW formed during the years after
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) split from the AFL. Sylvia stayed loyal
to the AFL after the split, and when the two unions competed for members, TWUACIO literature referred to Sylvia as a “Little Caesar.”52
Sylvia set up strike headquarters at the Labor Temple on 70 East Avenue in
Pawtucket and began to assemble his team.53 He appointed local UTW leaders
Elizabeth Nord and Joseph Gray to coordinate activities in the southern part of the
state and tasked Stella Moskwa and William Clark to cover the northern part.54 Sylvia
called for a meeting of all fifty-two Rhode Island UTW locals on Saturday, August
25th, at the larger Eagles Hall located on Snow Street in Providence.
While Sylvia jumped into action, local employers seemed nonplussed about the
possibility of a strike. When asked about the strike, employers told one local
newspaper that they were ‘far from alarmed.” “In fact,” one boss told a reporter,
“many of us would be glad to close our mill and let labor leaders bring about a
situation which they cannot control.” While some employers did not want their
sentiments attributed to them, it is clear at this early stage that a communication
pattern was emerging from the employer side. Coordinated or not, employers were, or
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at least wanted to be perceived as, unworried about the possibility of large-scale
disruptions. “Most of our mills were operating at only 40 percent of their capacity,” an
employer noted, adding, “and that few of them had large orders ahead.”55
At national UTW headquarters in Washington, D.C., union officials prepared
for the looming strike. Speaking to a gathering of UTW leaders, Gorman gave
instructions for how picket lines were to be conducted. He told the workers “be
orderly, and remain orderly, always.” Interestingly, he added, “Particularly be aware
of communist intrigue. Keep your ranks free of communism and communist trickery.
Stamp it out wherever it raises its head. Be stern about this.”56 He also said, “We will
have to fight not only the employers and their hired thugs but the communists who are
now trying to take advantage of this situation to promote their own philosophy.”57
The UTW, like many of the unions affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor (AFL), took strongly anti-communist positions in the early twentieth century.
Cletus Daniel notes this was a specific strategy, aimed at portraying the AFL unions as
a ‘lesser of two evils,” and thus attracting employer and public support, first when the
International Workers of the World emerged as a competitor for the loyalties of the
working class, and then later as the American Communist Party fought for workers’
sympathy and allegiance. This strategy rarely worked, Daniel points out, but the
UTW stuck to the play for decades.58 In her book, Common Sense Anti-Communism,
Jennifer Luff makes clear that the UTW was one of the more aggressively anti-
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communist unions, “vigorously” fighting Communist Party affiliated unions over
jurisdiction representing textile workers.59 In Rhode Island, the UTW was regularly
challenged for union membership by the Communist Party affiliated National Textile
Workers Union.
The American Communist Party answered Gorman’s complaints against them
in a series of articles published in The Daily Worker that were quickly converted into a
pamphlet titled “Communists in the Textile Strike: An Answer to Gorman, Green and
Co.” 60 The breathlessly worded pamphlet seemed particularly concerned Gorman
would sell out the strikers at the first opportunity and allow the dispute to be arbitrated
rather than fought out in the streets. “Don’t let Gorman, McMahon, or other A.F. of L.
officials mislead you into accepting any treacherous arbitration scheme. Close down
the mills and keep them closed with powerful mass picket lines.”61
UTW leaders gathered at the union’s Washington headquarters on August 30
to finalize their strike plans. McMahon and Gorman were joined by a delegation of
other union leaders who travelled over from the AFL headquarters along with a gaggle
of reporters. The normally affable UTW leaders were reportedly agitated and tense.62
With the crowd hovering over the telegraph machine, Gorman sent the following
telegram:
To all local unions, greetings. Strike of all cotton textile workers will
begin at 11:30 O’clock, your time, Saturday night. Put all previous
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instructions into effect. Wool, silk, rayon and synthetic yarn
membership stand by for further orders. Victory through solidarity.63
Gorman tried to read the telegram to the group but was drowned out by the cheers of
the union leaders in the room. When the din subsided, Gorman issued the following
statement to the press:
This telegram will call half a million workers to the strike lines. Not all
of those are now employed. The stretch out which adds to the machine
load of the worker until he can bear no more, has robbed thousands of
these their chance to work. But every man and woman will rally to the
strike lines and the great cotton textile industry will not move a wheel
or thread after the hour set to stop the mills.64
The telegram was sent despite last minute efforts by Lloyd Garrison, head of the
National Labor Relations Board, to avert a strike.65 Throughout the day, Garrison
conferred with UTW leaders and separately with George Sloan, the lead representative
of the textile employers. The UTW appeared willing to conference with industry
leaders and Garrison but Sloan refused to meet with the union representatives. Despite
his reluctance to meet, Sloan told reporters, “I suppose every citizen in America is
hopeful the strike won’t take place.”66
Despite the jubilant atmosphere, confusion set in at UTW headquarters.
Regardless of the telegram’s announcement of the strike start time, most locals were
separately instructed to strike on Tuesday, September 4, the day after Labor Day.
Regardless of that amendment to the instructions, some locals started their strike as
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soon as the news of the strike reached them. In Macron, Georgia, for example,
workers at the Bibb Manufacturing plant walked off their jobs upon receipt of the
telegram despite the threat issued by the company supervisor that “you automatically
forfeit your positions.”67
In Rhode Island, mill hands shared general excitement about the pending
strike. The meeting on August 25 called by Sylvia was filled to capacity, and not only
did delegates from all fifty-two Rhode Island locals attend, but the workers marched in
a parade to the meeting from the Loom Fixers Union hall in the Olneyville section of
Providence, down Westminster Street, to Eagles Hall. Reporters huddled outside the
meeting, waiting for any news about the strike. When the meeting ended, the press
reported the Rhode Island strike committee changed the time of the start of the strike
from September 1 (a Saturday when the mills were closed) to September 4 (the day
after the long holiday weekend), which Sylvia flatly denied.68 Adding to the
confusion, Sylvia was in a car accident the night of August 28. He crashed his car
while trying to pass another driver on his way home to Barrington, Rhode Island,
flipping it over and hitting a telephone pole. He broke his right wrist in the crash but
survived.69
Sylvia’s organizers met again at 2:00 Saturday afternoon, September 1, to
make final strike preparations. Looking to clarify when the strike would take place,
Sylvia walked back his earlier statements to the press and told reporters “we will
picket every mill whose operatives have been called out, whether union or not”
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starting on Tuesday, September 4.70 He also made clear the strike would be extended
to the entire cotton industry, including workers in the worsted wool, silk, rayon,
bleaching and dyeing, and printing industries. Sylvia made a point of singling out the
bleaching industry, saying that bleachery workers “have been misled in many
instances by the employers who infer that the strike does not apply to them and are
also included in the strike order. Workers have been advised to take their place in the
situation in order to correct once and for all the deplorable conditions under which
these employees have been forced to work.”71 Rhode Island AFL Vice President
Joseph Cahir also attended the gathering and told reporters the union coalition pledged
“complete moral and financial support of the strike.”72 It was also announced that
UTW President McMahon would be the guest of honor at the Rhode Island Labor Day
parade scheduled for Monday in Providence.
Once again, mill owners shrugged off the threat of the strike. “We shall not
pay any attention to the strike order whatsoever. The mill will be open Tuesday
morning as usual,” said Austin T. Levy, treasurer of the Stillwater Worsted Mill.73
Joseph Cull, president of the Cull Silk Mill, said “in my candid opinion, the vast
majority of silk workers don’t want this strike, and as far as Rhode Island is
concerned, this is a sympathy strike.”74 “The mill will remain open as usual on
Tuesday morning as far as we know. We have not received any notice of this strike
from our employes (sic). Some of our employes (sic), but by no means all, belong to
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the United Textile Workers,” said Everett Salisbury, manager of the large Atlantic
Mills in Providence.75 “If the majority want to work we will give them employment.
We have no issue with our employees,” said R.H.L. Goddard, president of the
Lonsdale Company.76
Despite the local mill owner reaction, nationally, textile operators were starting
to ramp up their rhetoric. George Sloan told reporters:
“We cannot accept as justified the violent procedure of the strike
against a Government code. We contend that the New Deal meant to
offer a guarantee of liberty to employes (sic) - a real freedom of choice
in their relationship to their employers. The American State cannot
permit a majority of American men and women to be coerced into an
organization to whose leadership they have not given their allegiance to
whose financial support they do not desire to contribute.77
Confusing things further, a Rhode Island based independent union, the
Independent Textile Union (ITU) of Woonsocket, raised doubts about participating in
the strike. In Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City,
1914-1960, historian Gary Gerstle reports the ITU initially voted against joining the
strike. According to Gerstle, the ITU “did not share the grievances of workers
elsewhere” because they had collective bargaining agreements in place that provided
terms well above what was called for in the NIRA. 78 ITU Local President Joseph
Schmetz told The Providence Journal that his members would only be “standing by”
when the strike starts and told his members to report to work as scheduled on
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Tuesday.79 Regardless of the status of the ITU’s collective bargaining agreements, the
union’s reluctance to get involved, at least initially, could be understood in the context
of their culturally different, and isolated, French-Canadian membership base.
On Monday, September 3, 10,000 people attended the annual Providence
Labor Day parade. Four thousand union members, led by grand marshal Joseph Cahir,
marched through the streets of Providence, accompanied by five marching bands. The
largest single group of marchers were from the UTW, with 500 members in the
parade. The parade passed a reviewing stand where UTW leaders McMahon and
Sylvia were joined by Providence Mayor James Dunne, Newport Mayor Mortimer
Sullivan, the Rev. Paul McElroy and several other local dignitaries. U.S. Congressman
Francis Condon addressed the crowd, as did Rhode Island Socialist Party leader
Joseph Coldwell.80
The highlight of the speaking program was UTW President McMahon. He told
the crowd that when the strike begins, do not to turn the other cheek:
Hit back if you are hit. Fight back even if you are shot down… No man
observes law and order more than I do, but if you’re hit, hit back as
hard as you can. Suffer, if you have to, and fight back, for that is the
only way to gain freedom. I have no fight with the constituted authority
of this State, but I know President Roosevelt would rather see mill
workers fight for the justice he demands for all labor. No power on
earth can stop it now. The cotton manufacturers said No, North and
South, they are united for exploitation. All right, let it be a show-down.
81
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Seemingly trying to reassure the workers the UTW was ready for action, McMahon
concluded his speech with “In spite of hell or high water we are going through with
this strike.”82
The drama of the day was not confined to the marching and the speeches. Just
after Congressman Condon spoke, the Providence police arrested two men, Lawrence
Spitz and Walter Petraska, who they accused of trying to disrupt the crowd. Spitz and
Petraska were spotted throwing “showers of communist handbills” into the crowd,
calling for the workers to engage in a general strike in support of the textile workers.
The leaflets accused McMahon and Gorman of getting ready to “sell out” the strikers
and demanded that the Communist Party affiliated National Textile Workers Union be
included in the strike preparations. It would not be the last time that Spitz was
apprehended by authorities during the strike.83
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THE STRIKE BEGINS IN RHODE ISLAND
After the initial confusion about its official start time, the strike in Rhode
Island started on Tuesday, September 4. The first days of the strike passed without
major incident in the state. However, in other parts of the country, picket line violence
immediately flared up; so local officials began to make preparations in case the same
thing happened here. Rhode Island Governor Theodore Francis Green addressed the
state’s American Legion convention in Westerly, Rhode Island, on September 6,
telling the Legionnaires:
"At such a time it is easy for passions to be aroused and when passions
are aroused acts of violence are apt to occur. It behooves all citizens,
not only those directly involved in the strike, but those indirectly
affected by it, and that means all of us, to do our best to remain calm
ourselves and to persuade others to be calm even in the face of
provocation."84
The state’s Attorney General, John Hartigan, a former commander of the Legion, told
the crowd the forces of law and order were prepared for any eventuality and that “mob
rule would not be tolerated in this state.” 85
The rest of the state’s political establishment began to jockey for position on
the issue of the strike. On September 7, on the floor of the Rhode Island State Senate,
Democratic Minority Leader William Troy, told his colleagues his party “should
brook no intimidation by local or State Police, and absolutely no military oppression
in any form.” The Majority Leader, Republican Harry T. Bodwell, responded by
claiming Troy was trying to politicize the strike. Bodwell told the Senate “In the crisis
that has arisen in the textile industry in Rhode Island as a result of the strike of

84
85

“Green Asks All to Remain Calm,” The Providence Journal, September 9, 1934.
Ibid.

31

workers, I feel the attitude of the Democratic party should be made manifest beyond
cavil.” Troy angrily responded to Bodwell, saying that he stood “uncompromisingly
with the men and women who are fighting a battle for a living wage, decent treatment
as to hours of labor and working conditions, and the recognition of their organized
unions in the matter of bargaining with the mill owners.” He went on to say:
“The idea of flaunting steel helmets and guns in the face of men and
women instead of calming them may incite excitement which might
lead to dangerous results. These people have a right to proceed in
peaceful surroundings and the mill barons should not be allowed to use
either the State Police or the National Guard to intimidate them.86
By Friday, September 7, clashes between workers and authorities at Rhode
Island mills were reported. Large groups of pickets formed from flying squadrons,
groups of workers travelling from factory in caravans of cars and trucks, forced the
Belmont and Manchester Mills of Woonsocket, Rhode Island, to shut down apparently
against the wishes of both the workers and the mill owners. In Westerly, the owners of
the George C. Moore Company successfully applied for a restraining order against
pickets and at the Hope Mill in Scituate, Rhode Island, pickets surrounded local police
Chief John Riley, who, fearing for his safety, drew his gun to escape from the
picketers and immediately called the State Police for backup. When State Police
Captain Jonathan Harwood arrived at the Hope Mill, UTW organizer Joseph Sylvia
was there with pickets massing around the entry of the plant, not allowing anything or
anyone in or out of the plant. As a result, Harwood issued an order, apparently meant
to be carried out statewide, limiting only four union pickets per location. Catching
Sylvia off guard with the sweeping order, he immediately went to Providence to meet
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with Attorney General Hartigan, who informed Sylvia that no such command had been
authorized.87
Seemingly not satisfied with Hartigan’s word, Sylvia rushed to the State House
and demanded an audience with Governor Green and tried to convince the governor
that the UTW was keeping their ranks in order and peaceful picketing should not be
restrained. If there was any trouble it was being brought in from out of state, likely
Connecticut, and not authorized by the union. Sylvia told Green that he could not be
held responsible for the actions of the flying squadrons as long as the four-picket limit
remained in place.88 After about an hour-long conference, Governor Green’s office
issued the following statement:
“Ex-Senator John H. Powers, vice president of the United Textile
Workers of America and connected with the National Labor Board, and
Mr. Joseph Sylvia of the United Textile Workers of America, requested
a conference this afternoon with the governor. Attorney General
Hartigan was also present. They conferred for over an hour on means
for maintaining order during the strike and in especial legal, peaceful
picketing in their rights at the same time the workers theirs. Messrs.
Powers and Silvia had assured him that was against the policy of the
strikers to allow anyone to come from outside the state in connection
with picketing or to countenance the commission of any breaches of the
peace. The governor stated that all present had felt hopeful that good
would result from the conference.”89
The statement was not only premature, but it would also become clear the UTW
officials did not have the ability to back-up such assurances to Governor Green.
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As the evening shift workers started to arrive at the Saylesville bleachery on
Friday, September 7, they were greeted by hundreds of picketers. The Saylesville plant
was ready for picketers to arrive because a day earlier the Saylesville plant posted a
notice on the company bulletin board warning workers of pending pickets. The
announcement alerted workers the company was warned about the arrival of pickets
and deputy sheriffs had been hired to protect the plant. Workers could use the
company cafeteria to eat “at rates calculated to suit the emergency.”90
While waiting for the Friday night shift to start, picketers assembled at the
corner of Walker and Chapel Streets, across the street from the main gate of the plant
and began taunting the workers showing up for work. Inside the gate, Deputy Sheriff
Herman Paster assembled a force of about twenty men and stared down the picketers.
It is important to note that the opposing sides were only a narrow streets’ width apart
from each other, with the picketers controlling high ground of an embankment on the
edge of Walker Street in front of what used to be the company clubhouse. Paster and
his fellow deputies were not official law enforcement officers but were hired directly
by the Saylesville plant to provide strike security. This informal army was not there to
keep the peace, but to serve the interests of their employer.
From the picketers’ side of the road, a group of boys began hurling rocks at the
deputies. One of the UTW’s picket captains, Theodore Brunelle, was injured in the
melee, hit in the stomach by flying rocks. UTW vice president John Powers ordered
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the boys to stop and they did.91 In the lull, Paster stepped forward and while
brandishing his revolver, said “You’ll get this if you don’t stop that.” Out of the
silence a voice from the crowd rose, shouting in response “We can take it.” Suddenly
another barrage of rocks flew towards the deputies, striking several. About a half
dozen deputies then charged the crowd, riot sticks wailing away indiscriminately.
Newspaper reports gleefully describe the deputies ``laying about them with their sticks
thwacking the heads and shoulders of the leaders.” Four of the crowd went down with
injuries; Harvey Jabotte of Central Falls, James Muirhead of Saylesville, Archie
Tremblay of Lincoln and Adelard Archambault of Providence.92 Considering the
addresses of the victims, doubt can be raised about the UTW’s claim that any picket
line trouble was caused by outsiders from Connecticut. It is not clear what
relationship, if any, the rock throwing boys had to the picketers but as we shall see, the
picketers had no relationship to the Saylesville facility.
The pickets retreated, regrouped, and surged again towards the deputies.
Paster ordered his men inside the plant gates to blast the pickets with a 200-pound
pressure hose, driving them away from the gate. In what would foreshadow the
advance and parry of the opposing sides over the next week, once out of range of the
hoses, the strikers reassembled and pushed forward once again; so, Paster once again
ordered them pushed back with the water. As the chaos worsened, local strike leader
and UTW organizer Adelard Gingras stepped forward out of the crowd and demanded
Paster take him to speak with the plant Superintendent Harold Reno. A truce of sorts

91

“Riot at Saylesville, RI, As Night Shift Leaves,” The Boston Daily Globe, September 8, 1934.
“State Troopers Rout Mob of 2000 Strikers After Disorder at Saylesville Plant,” The Providence
Journal, September 8, 1934.
92

35

settled in as Gingras entered the plant just long enough to demand Reno shut the mill
down, a demand bluntly rebuffed by Reno. He told Gingras the plant would continue
to operate “as long as the workers wished to continue working.” Maybe Gingras knew
what his answer was going to be and was simply buying time to let both sides cool off,
but in any event, he returned to the picket line without any news to report other than
the refusal to shut down.93
Shortly after Gingras’ parlay with Reno, State Police Lt. Ernest Stenhouse
arrived at the bleachery. He went into the facility and conferred with plant officials.
Press was not invited into the meeting so there is no record of what was discussed, but
Stenhouse left the brief meeting to make his way to the mill gate where he was joined
by a cadre of thirteen state troopers, armed with riot sticks, revolvers, steel helmets, a
machine gun and tear gas bombs. With this show of force, the troopers were able to
key the picketers from pushing forward or throwing rocks.94
The action was not over for the day, however. As the next shift ended around
11:00, about 100 pickets were still milling about near the bleachery, using the slack
time between confrontations to make their way back towards the plant gates. Once
again, the picketers were attacked by the deputy sheriffs, but this time with the State
Police in the vanguard, swinging their riot sticks. As the pickets retreated, strike
leader Gingras was heard yelling at the police that they would be back Monday with
200 more pickets.95
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By the end of the first week, reports were conflicting about how successful the
strike was at shutting down the textile industry in Rhode Island. Newspapers reported
mill owners claimed 81 mills closed with 35,000 workers idled. The UTW claimed
ninety-three plants were closed with 43,000 on strike. Regardless of who was right,
the strike was clearly impacting the operation of the mills, but without total shutdown,
the scene was set for future confrontation. 96
The weekend was calm in Saylesville and across Rhode Island, with only
minor confrontations reported. In Richmond, picketers successfully closed the Wood
River Woolen Company mill after plant superintendent William Hopwood invited
picketers into the plant, telling The Providence Journal that “if the workers lent a
willing ear to the pickets, the mill should be closed, but that if a majority of the
employees insisted they wished to work, then the pickets were to withdraw.”
Apparently trying to outfox the superintendent and force a shutdown, the pickets
refused the offer and Hopwood closed the plant “for the safety of employees.”97
On Saturday, September 8, the UTW got a boost of support when the nearby
independent union, the ITU, voted to join the strike. Joseph Schmetz, president of the
ITU, said on the first day of the strike that his members would be ‘standing by’ but
now would be joining in what he called a “good will strike.”98 The immediate effect of
the ITU joining the action was to close an additional eighteen mills. Schmetz made it
clear his members had “no grievances against the mill owners and would be making
no demands,” but would stand in solidarity with the striking UTW members. As he
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had stated just before the strike began, if the strike had shown some momentum, he
would order his members to join the picket lines in order to increase pressure on the
government to improve working conditions across the country. Apparently, Schmetz
saw the momentum he was waiting for. 99
The violence on Friday night in Saylesville forced state officials into a
defensive posture. Providence Police Superintendent John Kelly issued a press release
setting down a marker for the UTW. Published on the front page of the Sunday
edition of The Providence Journal, Kelley’s statement said:
On Tuesday Sept. 4. Joseph A Sylvia, representing himself to be the
director in New England of the strike now being conducted by the
United Textile Workers of America, and a Mr. Clark, a local leader of
the union, made an agreement with me, in my office at police
headquarters that picketing by members of the United Textile Workers
of America, which they represented, would be conducted in a peaceful,
orderly and lawful manner and there would be no intimidation
whatsoever of workers entering or leaving the mills, and further agreed
to keep their picket lines properly supervised and under the control of
leaders.
However, on many occasions since that agreement was made there has
been intimidation of workers entering or leaving mills in Providence by
members of picket lines. It has been obvious to the police on duty at
these plants that these pickets were not under control and that illegal
picketing was being carried on. 100
Kelly’s statement is one clue about how disorganized the UTW strike was in
Rhode Island.
The UTW’s Sylvia was busy over the weekend rallying his troops. More than
1,500 strikers and supporters gathered for a mass rally at Miller’s Pavilion in the
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Pawtuxet Valley near several shuttered mills. Sylvia harangued the attendees, oddly
telling them that “You are as much at fault for the present working conditions as the
bosses.”101 The speech seemed typical of Sylvia, who as the titular head of the strike in
New England, seemed to have little control over the actions on the picket lines
throughout Rhode Island and eerily foreshadowed the distance the union would
eventual try to established between itself and what took place in Saylesville and
elsewhere.
Governor Green spent the weekend hunkered down with advisors at the State
House. Green, a Democrat, was serving his first term as governor, having won the
office in 1932 after losing campaigns for the office in 1912, 1918, and 1930. Born in
1867 to one of Rhode Island’s elite families (his great-great grandfather has been a
member of the Continental Congress), Green’s professional background was as a
corporate lawyer. He began his political career as a ‘reform’ candidate just after the
turn of the century, trying to wrest political control of the levers power from the
Republican Party which had dominated Rhode Island politics since the Civil War. But
with the onset of the Great Depression, Green attached himself to the Roosevelt
campaign for President in 1932 and was swept into office in the Democratic sweep of
that year.102
Organized labor was only one faction of a broad coalition of interest groups
that supported Green’s campaign for governor in 1932. Despite decades of political
activity, Green only briefly served in elected office in 1907 and therefore did not have
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the opportunity to establish a legislative record on union issues. In the pre-New Deal
campaign, Green’s slogan was “Humanity First,” based upon his belief that a key
reason for the unemployment crisis of the Depression was the growing shift from
human labor to machines in factory production.103
At the State House, Green met with the Attorney General, the
Superintendent of the State Police, and the Adjutant General of the National Guard to
discuss what preparations were underway for the strike and potential violence. He
prepared a statement that would appear in the media on Monday, September 10,
saying that picketing would only be “allowed if it were peaceful and without distress,
if pickets were officially designated by their leaders and properly identified by some
marking.” Sensing his administration faced criticism for how it responded to the
events in Saylesville and elsewhere, Governor Green defended himself, citing the lack
of violence on the day after the flare up in Saylesville, and claiming it was “hard,
therefore, to understand the few criticisms that have been directed at the State Police
and myself.” He seemed to insinuate the fear of violence was being ginned up by
forces ready to deploy “extreme and arbitrary measures in mere anticipation of
violence.” He urged calm and tried to position his administration neutrally between the
picketers and the mill owners.104
While Green seemed to think the worst was behind him, the owners of the
Saylesville bleachery prepared for additional trouble. More deputy sheriffs were added
to Herman Paster’s outfit during the evening of Sunday, September 9. Paster told the
press there would be no picketing allowed near the bleachery, believing his reading of

103
104

Ibid., 139.
“Governor Issues Call on Appeal of High Sheriff,” The Providence Journal, September 11, 1934.

40

the riot act on Friday gave him sweeping powers of enforcement. “That’s the law,”
Paster told The Providence Journal, “and the law will be enforced.”105
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THE STRIKE ESCALATES
On the morning of September 10, with a small army of armed men patrolling
the exterior of the plant, the company posted a notice to its employees reading “The
objective which the leaders of the strikers have set for themselves is to shut this Plant
down. They have no hostility or grievance against the Plant or its employees but in
order to accomplish a complete shutdown of ALL Plants, have tried to force us to stop
all work.” Describing the situation as a “war,” bleachery management rearranged work
schedules and secured transportation for their workers to and from the plant.106
For most of the day it was quiet near the bleachery, but on Monday afternoon
tensions flared once again. Two workers leaving the day shift were spotted by
picketers as they walked out of the mill towards Central Falls. At the corner of
Lonsdale Avenue and Walker Street, near where the action took place on Friday night,
a group of picketers surrounded the workers, while other pickets, now numbering in
the hundreds, cheered them on.107 One of the picketers got in the face of the leaving
workers and started to boo at them. One of the departing workers punched the picket
and a fight started.108 As the State Police rushed into the crowd in a phalanx to rescue
the trapped workers, the pickets let loose with a hail of rocks. Lt. Stenhouse ordered
his men to charge the pickets, pushing back many of them with tear gas grenades.
About forty pickets were still engaged with the workers, forcing the State Police to
wheel around and push through them in a wedge formation.109
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It is this incident that scholar James Findlay describes as the point of no return
for the violence in Saylesville.110 Findlay describes “[t]he manhandling of strikers by
deputy sheriffs was a major factor leading to the outbreak of violence, especially at
Saylesville, where the conflict occurred only a week after the strike began.”111 But I
disagree with his assessment that “From the onset the strike seemed well organized in
Rhode Island, partly because the UTW itself was relatively well organized in the
State.”112 I read the primary source material to reveal the UTW to be less well
organized than he claims, in part, evidenced by their inability to truly shut down the
industry in the state . Though the numbers were in dispute between the UTW and The
Providence Journal, by the end of the first week of the strike, at best only about half
of the state’s cotton mills were closed.113
Findlay also argues the violence at Saylesville escalated because of a struggle
for power between the strikers and management. He writes, “The steady escalation of
conflict and violence in Saylesville from September 10 to September 12 was caused
by several factors. Among the most important was the strikers’ determination to force
the closing of the Sayles complex.”114 But why was this mill so important? For
example, less than a mile away, thousands of workers for the J. & P. Coats and
Company were still working and sent a petition to Governor Green, signed by 97.5
percent of the workforce, asking for state protection so they could go to work
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“unmolested.115” Other bleacheries, including the Lincoln Bleachery in the nearby
village of Lonsdale, also did not join the strike. Findlay does not explain why the
Saylesville plant was so important.
As the tear gas saturated the area, pickets retreated down Lonsdale Avenue
covering their eyes. Two local boys, Richard and Robert Blais, 1-year old twins, were
evacuated from their house in the neighborhood, overcome by the fumes. Another
local woman, Anna Hayden, collapsed from the gas exposure and was transported to
the hospital.116 While the attack was underway, a United Electric Railway trolley was
forced to stop in the middle of the maelstrom and its passengers were forced to
abandon their ride and flee.117
On the streets of Saylesville, the situation was again escalating out of control.
With the State Police leading the way, pushing back the bulk of the picketers, the
deputy sheriffs, joined by twenty members of the Central Falls police force, guarded
the main gate of the plant. Under a new onslaught of rocks launched by picketers who
had managed to double-back away from the State Police through the Moshassuck
Cemetery, the deputy sheriffs opened fire on them with their riot guns -- essentially
sawed-off shotguns. Four workers went down - Lionel Costa of Pawtucket, Armand
Gervais of Central Falls, and Daniel McKeon of Pawtucket were shot while Louis
Fercki of Pawtucket suffered a fractured skull. McKeon suffered a buckshot wound in
his shoulder while Costa and Gervais had small arms wounds in their lower backs.118
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While the wounded were transported two miles away to Notre Dame Hospital
in Central Falls, police swept in to make arrests. Three men were captured: Fred
Najjar, 30, identified at the time as a Syrian immigrant living in Pawtucket, Michael
Barlik, 24, of nearby South Attleboro, Massachusetts, and Mathews De Sa Carvalho,
20, also of Pawtucket. The men were brought to the Lincoln State Police Barracks.
The Providence Journal reported Najjar had a rock in his pants pockets when he was
searched in the barracks and that he was “unable to account for it.”119
A thunderstorm rolled through the area around 6 p.m., driving the crowd
away.120 As the streets cleared, a public works crew deployed to sweep the streets of
leftover rocks from the encounter in front of the gate while the State Police established
a front line at the corner of Walker Street and Lonsdale Ave. They strung barbed wire
across the street and mounted a machine gun in the direction of the strikers who were
pushed through what was now a no-man’s land between the State Police and the
Moshassuck Cemetery. Travel was banned in the area, creating the sense of a war
zone in the neighborhood.121
As order was restored, High Sheriff Jonathan Andrews rushed to the State
House to meet with Governor Green. On his way into the meeting, Andrews told The
Providence Journal: “I think the situation will get worse out there. My men have been
on duty 24 hours a day since last Thursday and they are about at the end of their
endurance. I can’t speak for the State Police, but I know they had a hard day and I
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doubt they would be able to go through another one as hard.”122 He delivered a
personal report to the governor, reviewing what took place on Friday night and what
had only recently happened again in Saylesville, and recommended he dispatch the
National Guard to the scene. His note to Governor Green read in part: “I am firmly
convinced that the services of the militia are required and I therefore request you order
out immediately sufficient troops to suppress such mob and to prevent the perpetration
of further acts of violence and a possible loss of life.”123
Governor Green spent the evening conferencing with many of the state’s
elected leaders and in the evening addressed the state in a radio broadcast. Again,
trying to carve a middle path, the governor told the people of Rhode Island the
violence was a result of a clash of two opposing forces: one was the communists, who
in Green’s words “at least had the virtue of sincerity.” The other force was the
“reactionaries,” who were looking for an excuse to unleash reprisals. Interestingly, in
a dispute with the pro-management The Providence Journal, the newspaper refused to
print all of Green’s remarks because he would not release a full transcript.124 There
was no evidence to support Green’s claim that “the communists” had anything to do
with the violence in Saylesville but as we shall see, multiple players would start to lay
the blame on them. It is also unclear who Green considered “the reactionaries.”
William McLoughlin’s Rhode Island: A History, briefly mentions the strike and offers
a tantalizing tidbit about how the American Legion and the Ku Klux Klan “announced
that they would take care of any outside agitators who entered the state,” but it seems
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more likely that Green, himself a former lawyer for the mill barons, was referring to
the owners of the mills.125 And as we will see later, at least one person on the
management team at the Saylesville bleachery was an archetypical reactionary.
While Governor Green continued to hunker down in the State House, at 10:30
that night, 500 picketers tried to storm the mill. Under the cover of darkness, picketers
had a natural advantage against the well-armed police force in front of them. The
State Police had arranged for boxes of ammunition to be delivered to the picket lines
and part of the arsenal included Very lights, a type of sighting flare soldiers used on
the front lines in the trench warfare of World War 1 to spot enemy soldiers crossing no
man’s land. The police fired the Very lights into the sky and fired tear gas into the
crowd as the picketers attacked the police with stones, though no further victims were
reported.126 Adding to the mayhem, pickets started pulling fire alarms in boxes lining
the streets of Saylesville and Central Falls. Under the lights and gas, residents started
to flee the neighborhood.127
At 4:00 on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, General Dean’s troops
began to assemble at two armories in Providence - the North Main Street Armory and
the Cranston Street Armory. Meanwhile, Governor Green drafted legislation giving
him the authority to increase the number of State Police officers during “actual or
threatened rioting or serious breaches of the peace.” Green sent the draft bill to the
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General Assembly, along with a request for $25,000 to fund the initiative. In another
radio broadcast later that evening, Green told the people of Rhode Island, “To make it
clear, it is not the intention that these men shall be added to the force for the purpose
of breaking the present strike, but only for the protection of all parties, directly or
indirectly interested - strikers, workers, employees, and the general public.”128
While Green maneuvered, the Saylesville bleachery braced for more attacks.
The company posted another notice to workers, laying out their interpretation of
events. To the plant managers, the trouble was clearly caused by the union leaders
who were bent on forcing the plant to close. They told their workers effective the
following day, the hours of work would change from a three, 8-hour shift format to a
two, 12-hour shift system.129 Later in the day new reporters began to assemble near the
plant in set up a base camp in a shop called Brodeur’s, at 1101 Lonsdale Avenue,
directly in between the State Police barrier at the corner of Walker and Lonsdale and
the gates of the Moshassuck Cemetery where the picketers encamped. Sheriff
Andrews used the same building as a command center; so, the reporters essentially
were now embedded with the Sheriff’s troops.130
The State Police continue to patrol the perimeter they established at the corner
of Walker and Lonsdale Avenue and reinforced their position by stationing Corporal
Robert Burns, a World War I veteran, with a machine gun on top of the bleachery
roof. The Central Falls Police Department assembled under the command of Chief
George Collette and stationed themselves with the State Police at the Walker Street
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intersection. Andrew’s deputies stationed themselves by the corner of Lonsdale and
Conduit Street, in front of a company gate leading into a filtration plant. 131
Slowly, as the afternoon progressed, the crowd in the streets of Saylesville
began to build in size. With the various combatants from the night before back in their
respective corners, one can imagine each faction looking over the vacant space
between them wondering who or what would set things in motion again today. The
spark was lit around 3:00 when a dump truck from the Durastone Company, located
on the back side of the plant’s property, turned left from Higginson Avenue onto
Lonsdale Avenue with a truck load of bricks destined for a Pawtucket City Hall
construction project. As the truck lumbered past the picketers and into the no man’s
land it was abruptly stopped by the people on the street. While the driver, Peter
Beretta, was taken out of the truck cab and roughed up by a handful of picketers,
others swarmed onto the truck and began to hand its cargo down to their comrades on
the street.132
While the police rushed to get the truck out of the way and back on the road,
the newly armed pickets turned on the deputy sheriffs guarding the gate to the
bleachery’s filtration plant. Under a fusillade of brick, the deputies momentarily
retreated, giving the picketers just enough time to crash through the gate guarding the
filtration plant and tear down a guard shack. Chaos erupted. The Central Falls police
rushed to the corner of Conduit Street, leaving the State Police behind because their
orders did not allow them to leave the Lincoln side of Saylesville. While they sprinted
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to the scene, at 3:12 the first shots of the day were fired by the deputy sheriffs. Three
pickets went down. Mrs. Leonie Gussart, 73, of Pawtucket, was shot with a riot gun
in the shins, Ernest LeGrade, 28, and Wilfred Plante, 32, both of Pawtucket, were shot
in the legs. An unnamed picket was clubbed in the head while another unnamed
woman was carried away in a hysterical fit, screaming repeatedly “I’m afraid, I’m
afraid.” The wounded were again transported to Notre Dame Hospital.133
During the chaos, Rocky Martell, President of the Central Falls City Council
and a resident of Lonsdale Avenue near where the battle was taking place tried his best
to direct traffic which was, incredibly, still travelling up and down the street. Because
the State Police had Walker Street barricaded, the trackless trolley had to travel farther
down Lonsdale Avenue than usual on temporary wires. At one point in the
commotion a car jumped the sidewalk and nearly crushed a group of young people
who were standing on the sidewalk watching the action. Within minutes the police and
sheriffs started to drive the crowd back towards the cemetery gates.134
As the attack unfolded, Sheriff Andrews, from his post inside Brodeur’s store,
called Governor Green and asked for help from the militia. The reporters in the room
overheard a heated conversation with the governor and reported Andrews saying,
“You want to wait until something happens. I want to protect the people who want to
go to work,” clearly indicated which side of the conflict his allegiances lay. When
Andrews hung up, he turned to the press corps and said “Well, it’s on his shoulders if
they all get killed out there.” After the assault at Conduit Street, Andrews was back
on the phone to Governor Green: “It’s on your head, governor, if you don’t send those
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troops to Saylesville. They’ve broken down the gate and I don’t know what they are
going to do next.” On this word, Governor Green called General Dean and gave him
the order to deploy.135
There were close to 3,000 people on the streets of Saylesville at this point. An
aid to Governor Green rushed to Sheriff Andrews location to tell him the Guard was
on the way and to contact the governor immediately. When Andrews phoned the
governor, he was informed that he was being relieved from duty.136 Perhaps because
he saw the huge crowd on the street gear up for action or perhaps because in his
opinion he did not report to the governor but instead reported to his paymasters at the
Saylesville bleachery, Andrews told the governor’s aid that he would “take that under
advisement.” He then called Robert B. Dresser, the attorney for the factory, and told
him that the militia was on the way. Dresser instructed the company to tell the sheriffs
to return to the barracks inside the factory gates until a decision was made, by the
company, if they wanted the sheriffs to remain on duty.137
While Andrews’ deputy sheriffs retreated, the militia mustered to bugle calls
and boarded trucks to head to Saylesville. One hundred men of the 103rd Field
Artillery, commanded by Col. Harold Baker, were given a police escort out of
Providence for the five-mile drive to Saylesville. A second detail of 150 soldiers from
the 243rd Coast Artillery under the command of Col. John Collins left the nearby
Cranston Street Armory. Among the soldiers were several recent graduates of Brown
University, and the University’s alumni magazine later boasted of the ‘legendary’
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service of their graduates, who provided both aerial and other surveillance for the
militia.138
The troops arrived in Saylesville at 4:10 and unloaded from their trucks in
relative silence. However, as the last truck pulled into the area the crowd started to
boo the soldiers and as they finished deploying the rocks started to fly. For five
minutes, the Guard withstood the barrage of stones while they formed up in orderly
lines of ten men each. Suddenly, an officer’s whistle blew, and the Guardsmen
attacked the crowd, indiscriminately swinging riot clubs at whomever was in their
way.139
People fled down side streets and through the backyards of the neighborhood.
The Providence Journal described the attack on the pickets gleefully: “In a few cases
their pursuers were fleeter. Down came the clubs. Girls and women scurried for cover,
shrieking as though they were departing for all time, but soon quiet prevailed.”140
After the crowd retreated to safety, they regrouped and pushed back against the Guard.
For the rest of the afternoon this pattern of assault and counter assault continued. In
one push by the soldiers, they shot a volley of rifle fire over the heads of the pickets,
which forced them back to the Dexter Street intersection. Incredibly, during the fray,
the soldiers dropped a box of tear gas bombs that was picked up by the pickets. The
people promptly began to throw the bombs back at the Guard itself, pushing them
back to the Walker Street barricade. Flummoxed, the Guard switched to nausea gas
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and made another push. The entire neighborhood was poisoned with the gas, sending
the Blais twins to the hospital for a second day in a row.141
At around 6:00 that evening, the Guard, outmatched on the street, called for
reinforcements. All Guardsmen across the state were ordered to muster at their home
armories and await orders. General Dean would not comment about how many
soldiers he had at his disposal, but the reports were the entire Guard comprised 550
soldiers and 50 officers. Since he was himself in the field, General Dean had to
improvise in how his order was to be conveyed to his men. In Newport, Company F
of the 118th Engineers, was called to duty with two rounds of nine blows of the fire
alarm horn. Other troops mustered after hearing a radio broadcast calling them to duty,
which The Providence Journal reported was 80% effective. 142
At 7:00, the reinforcements arrived. The 153rd Hospital Company set up a
field station behind the factory gates under the command of Major Earle Brennan to
treat the wounded militiamen. As the militia moved to surround the entire bleachery
area the pickets regrouped on their side of no man’s land. As daylight waned, the
parish priest from St. Mathieu’s Church at the corner of Dexter and Lonsdale Streets
pleaded with Central Falls Police Chief George Collette to get the picketers off the
church grounds. Collette was refused help from the Guard in this task, so with his
twenty-two men he tried to get the pickets to withdraw from the church property. He
was aided by Theodore Brunelle from the UTW. Brunelle jumped atop a car and
pleaded with the crowd to withdraw.143
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Whether the crowd was following the orders of Collette and Brunelle, or
whether they simply took a dinner break, the pickets did not launch another major
attack until just before 10:00 that night when they attacked the soldiers at three points.
One attack happened directly in front of the Moshassuck Cemetery, where some
soldiers were stationed. Another at the corner of Lonsdale and Liberty Streets, where
the Sheriffs patrolled, guarding the area where the pickets earlier torn down the gate.
The third was at the State Police barricade at Walker and Lonsdale. Learning from
their better armed adversaries, the pickets fired Roman candles into the air to acting
improvised Very lights. At least one soldier, Captain John C. Ball, was injured
significantly enough in the battle in the cemetery with a head wound that he had to be
transported to the field hospital for treatment.144
While all this was going on, Joseph Sylvia from the UTW finally appeared on
the picket line in Saylesville. He drove his car to the rear side of the militia lines and
asked to speak with General Dean. After keeping him waiting for 30 minutes, the
General agreed to speak with Sylvia inside the factory gates in the Guard’s makeshift
barracks. While Dean and Sylvia were cloistered in the barracks for over an hour, the
battle intensified on the street. The soldiers and police, caught off guard by the
ferocity of the attack, again flooded the area with gas. The Guard could no longer stop
the crowd from advancing with the gas bombs, so an order was dispatched back to the
armory for an order of more ammunition. Sylvia and Dean finished their conference
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without comment to the press. Sylvia left the picket line area and Dean resumed his
position at the command post.145
The battle continued for several more hours. At 12:30 in the morning, the
pickets were finally able to knock out the last remaining streetlight at the corner of
Tucker Street, casting the whole battle zone into complete darkness. With extra cover,
the pickets intensified their attack. This time, General Dean himself led the
Guardsmen’s counter offensive, driving the pickets back again into the grounds of the
cemetery. At 1:15, the 243rd Coast Artillery unit deployed three anti-aircraft lights,
adding to the warfare like atmosphere in the streets. At 2:00, a cohort of 300 pickets,
including several “young girls and youths” marched down Lonsdale Avenue toward
the line of the Guardsmen. The pickets taunted the soldiers, daring them to shoot.
One woman, it was reported, stood in front of the crowd, trying to provoke the armed
militia men, daring them to shoot her where she stood. In a notable shift, newspaper
reports described the hostile crowd as hurling “communist rhetoric” at the soldiers,
cursing the government while the soldiers “stood silent under epithets and jeers.”146
After almost 12 hours of continuous fighting, the pickets started to slip away, but not
before removing all the manhole covers on Liberty Street and opening up the fire
hydrants, flooding the underground wire channels. By 3:00 in the morning the streets
were empty, and what The Pawtucket Times was already referring to as “The Battle of
Moshassuck Cemetery” was over.147
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During the day, at least fifty pickets were injured, including three who were
shot. Among the injured was Peter Szeliga, a 19-year-old Central Falls man who was
treated at Notre Dame Hospital for first degree burns on his hand after he picked up an
unexploded gas bomb and it blew up in his hand. Seven Guardsmen were injured,
including Private Chester Bromley of the 103rd Field Artillery, who suffered powder
burns on his hand when he picked up one of the Guard’s lost gas bombs the pickets
had commandeered for their defense. Seven people were arrested, all of whom lived
in the general vicinity of the strike area but none of whom worked at the Saylesville
plant. Newspaper reports claim that during the entire day, nearly the entire workforce
of the bleachery reported to work.148
With the situation on the streets out of control, Governor Green made another
radio broadcast to the people of Rhode Island. As Green’s biographer Erwin L.
Levine emphasizes in Theodore Francis Green, the Rhode Island Years, the governor
desperately wanted to keep order while not being accused of breaking the strike.149
Green’s predecessor, Emery San Souci, lost his bid for re-election after ordering the
National Guard to attack strikers during the 1922 textile strike. Governor Green told
his constituents, “order must be restored - not in the interest of the plant, not in the
interest of any particular group, but in the interest of the safety of the state of Rhode
Island.” The day before Green blamed the violence on both communists and
reactionaries, this time he placed the blame on the sheriffs. He told the people:
What a difference between the record of the State Police in this
emergency and the record of the deputy sheriffs; the contrast between
doing things the right way and doing things the wrong way. The State
148
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Police have not fired a shot. Everyone one of the persons - men and
women- were shot down by the deputy sheriffs - not due to the
individual man as much as to the system- men untrained and unsuited
for this delicate work, armed with guns, who in many cases pushes into
the crowd with rough words cause [sic] intentional provocation.150
The governor also expressed exasperation with Sheriff Andrews. After ordering him
and his men to stand down, Andrews told him he had to consult with mill ownership
before complying with the order. “He meant, I suppose,” Governor Green said, “Mr.
Robert B. Dresser. In other words, the order of the governor in this emergency is
subject to the veto of Mr. Robert B. Dresser.”151
Dresser, the lawyer for the bleachery, was the archetypal reactionary in
Green’s now abandoned “both sides” argument. Throughout the strike he served as
spokesperson for the Sayles Finishing Plant and, as Green’s comments indicate,
directed the actions of Sheriff Andrews and his deputies. Dresser was a long-time
conservative activist, later becoming a member of the John Birch Society, and
regularly publishing right-wing broadsides in conservative and libertarian magazines
like The Freeman and The Committee for Constitutional Government.152 In the late
1950’s and early 1960’s he led the opposition in Rhode Island against laws aimed at
prohibiting housing discrimination against African-Americans.153 When he died at age
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95 in 1976, the New York Times wrote of him, “He believed the Federal Government
was destroying the private enterprise system through taxation.”154
As James Findlay confirms in his essay, eyewitness reports in the press clearly
indicate the deputy sheriffs were provoking the violence from the pickets. Former
State Representative Arthur Costigan who lived in the neighborhood told reporters he
would be filing a formal protest over the ‘provocative methods’ used by the sheriffs,
including pointing their guns at pickets without reason. At another point in the melee
a deputy sheriff threw a tear gas bomb through the window of Brodeur’s store,
injuring Providence Journal photographer George Goodreau and sending the rest of
the press corps scrambling for cover.155 But simply transferring command of the
streets from the sheriffs to the militia did little to quell the uprising.
The deputy sheriffs were gone from the streets of Saylesville on the morning of
September 12. In their place were fresh National Guard troops who moved
immediately to assert their presence. At 6:00 in the morning, with hundreds of pickets
assembled on the Central Falls side of Lonsdale Avenue, next to St. Mathieu's Church,
the Guard issued an order to disperse. When the pickets refused to move, the Guard
fired their rifles over the heads of the crowd. General Dean was later asked if he had
given orders to his men to “shoot to kill?” “No,” he said, but ominously added “the
bullets just missed.”156 After the shooting, Col. Herbert Barker of the 103rd led thirtytwo of his men onto the grounds of Moshassuck Cemetery, with bayonets mounted on
their rifles, to track down a group of suspected ring leaders of the pickets who had fled
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for protection from the gunshots behind gravestones. A volley of rifle fire, some
ripping through headstones, forced the hiding pickets out from cover and back onto
the street, where they were apprehended by the guardsmen. Ten people, including 16year-old Rita Brouilette of Central Falls, were marched single file by the soldier to an
awaiting truck that transported them to the Lincoln police station.157
Shortly before 7:00, seven more truckloads of troops arrived on the scene. The
soldiers were detailed to clean up the considerable debris off Lonsdale Ave from the
battle the day before. As the soldiers began to station themselves at their posts,
pickets jeered at them, telling them to “go home and do the housekeeping” and “you’d
shoot your own mother.” The crowd continued to swell, as did the number of troops,
now reported to be a force of 1,200 strong. At 10:00, General Dean ordered
sharpshooters stationed at the gates of Moshassuck Cemetery sending a clear message
they were preparing for a serious confrontation and not to be trifled with.158
With the troops massing on the street, the Saylesville community began to
show signs of battle fatigue. St. Mathieu’s parochial school and the West Side
grammar school across the street from St. Mathieu's Church released their pupils early
with instructions to go home. Rev. Peter Hanley of nearby Holy Trinity Church told
his parochial school pupils they too would be released early. But if the schools had
hoped releasing the students would get them to safety from what they feared the Guard
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was gearing up for, they were mistaken. The students, at least some of the older ones,
appear to have joined the crowd of pickets, swelling their numbers even further.159
While the schools were shutting down, General Dean and his men dug in.
Around 11:00 in the morning, the 118th Engineering Company dug holes in the street
and erected wooden posts to connect barbed wire in what Harold Fletcher, a National
Guardsman at the time of the troubles, described as a French highwire double apron,
affectionately known as a ‘gooseberry.160 But while the troops were digging in,
carloads of new picketers began to arrive. However, unlike the mass of people at the
other end of Lonsdale Avenue, these pickets seemed organized. The 140 people were
all wearing white armbands and collected themselves in teams of twenty. They
approached the Guard barricade and asked to be let through so they could picket in
front of the factory gate. However, Col. Harold Baker refused them safe passage.161
A man stood out from the crowd and told Col. Baker his name was William
Clark of Providence and that he was an organizer for the UTW. According to Clark, he
and his official pickets had been authorized under an agreement with the governor and
the union to allow groups of 20 pickets, duly recognizable by their white armbands, to
picket during daylight hours. Baker still refused passage. Within minutes, Joseph
Sylvia arrived on the scene and confirmed Clarke’s story about a deal being made with
Governor Green. Baker still refused passage to the group.162 This group of authorized
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union pickets was the first sign of organized activity by the UTW since Friday
evening.
While the UTW tangled with Baker and the Guard, Governor Green sought to
gain control of the political situation. That morning he delivered a letter to Sheriff
Andrews asking for the names of all the men who had served as deputy sheriffs at the
Saylesville plant. Apparently reacting to the reports of the misadventures of the armed
deputies, Governor Green told Andrews to “Consider this an order, not a request.”163
The governor met again with General Dean, who apprised him of the situation. While
they were meeting, reports came to the State House that the crowd was growing again
in Saylesville. Dean rushed back to the scene and the governor issued the following
statement:
The situation in Saylesville is still serious. General Dean and I have
been conferring in my office and were interrupted by news that the mob
was collecting again and he immediately left to take command there.
Order must be reestablished in the interest of all - the workers, the mill
owners and you, the people of the state. Please try to realize this;
realize also that you have a duty to perform. The large number of
people not connected with the strike who congregated about the
Saylesville bleachery yesterday and last night added to the disorder and
made it difficult for the National Guard to do their work properly.
Practically all, if not all, of the persons arrested proved to be neither
former workers of the mill nor strikers; they were curiosity seekers or
hoodlums. I beg of you all to keep away from that neighborhood. No
one should go there unless absolutely obliged to do so. Every curiosity
seeker adds to the confusion. He not only runs the risk of injury and
possible loss of life, if shots are to be fired, but also, he adds to the
danger of others. Let everyone help in this emergency and one way of
helping is by keeping away from places of disorder, keep away
yourself, and urge everyone else to keep away. I ask for your help and
am confident it will be given.164
163
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As General Dean left the State House, he issued an ominous statement to the
assembled press:
My men have taken severe punishment for 14 hours. They have been
the target for rocks of all kinds and sizes, but from now on there will be
no more rock throwing. We are not going to tolerate any further
hurling of such things. The moment rock throwing starts we will act
much differently than we have up to this point.165

As in the previous days there was a midday lull in the action on the streets
before, midway through the afternoon, the opposing sides geared up for battle. The
soldiers began to spread more barbed wire across Lonsdale Ave at the corner of
Liberty street, essentially cutting the ‘no man’s land’ between the Guard’s line and the
picketers’ line in half.166 As the Guardsmen locked themselves into position, about
500 pickets marched up the streets towards them. As the hot summer sun beat down
on the combatants, rocks started to fly at the soldiers. The pickets began to improvise
with their weapons, filling bottles with nails and screws, and even stringing a rubber
inner tube from a car tire in between two tree limbs at the corner of Moshassuck
cemetery to use as a giant slingshot.167 As the barrage opened up, one guardsman,
William Castaldi, was hit in the head with a flowerpot flung from the slingshot.168
As promised by General Dean, the Guardsmen showed no tolerance for the
attack. Four soldiers armed with rifles deployed to the corner of the barbed wire post
and the order to fire was given. The soldiers fired indiscriminately into the crowd,
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which had now grown to nearly 5,000 people. The crowd panicked and ran for cover
into the cemetery, breaking off pieces of headstones to fling back at the pursuing
Guardsmen. Two teenage boys ducked for cover behind two of the gravestones close
to the street and raised handkerchiefs as white flags, and they were dragged to safety
behind the soldiers’ line. After the volley of shots, the guard used “gas guns” to shoot
tear and nausea gas at the pickets, blanketing the entire area again with noxious fumes.
The crowd retreated as best they could back to the Central Falls side of Lonsdale
Avenue, picking up their wounded along the way.169
Three people were shot. Nicholas Gravello, 22, of Pawtucket, was shot through
the right arm, Charles Gorcynski, 18, of Central Falls, was shot in the stomach and
William Blackwood, 44, of Pawtucket, was shot in the head. Unlike the previous
shooting victims, who had been hit with buck shot from deputy sheriffs, these men
were hit with rifle fire. The wounded were rushed to Notre Dame Hospital where it
was clear that Gorcynski and Blackwood were in grave condition. Father St. Goddard
of Notre Dame Church performed the Last Rights on Gorcynski while Blackwood’s
mother collapsed when she arrived at the hospital discovering her son was shot.
Witnesses told reporters neither man was directly connected to the strike. Gorcynski
was employed at another nearby mill and was the sole breadwinner for his family,
including eight brothers and sisters. Blackwood, an unemployed weaver, had gone to
the picket line looking for his 18-year-old son who was reportedly involved in the
action.170
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As reports started to filter back to the lines about the fate of the wounded,
General Dean told reporters that his “men went out with the intention of shooting
anybody who did not obey their orders.”171 With open warfare in the streets, the
community leaders in the area demanded an end to hostilities. Robert Briden,
president of the Board of Trustees of Moshassuck cemetery fired off a terse telegram
to Governor Green demanding his cemetery be protected. The message read:
The Board of Trustees of Moshassuck Cemetery demand protection for
the graves of our loved ones who are interred in this sacred ground. We
appeal to you as governor to prevent the desecration that has taken
place during the past few days.172
The Pawtucket Common (i.e., City) Council was more demanding of Green. They
met in emergency session and passed the following resolution:
Whereas the Pawtucket Common Council interested in the welfare of
the citizens of this city and the peace of this city and neighboring
communities, urge the governor to use whatever power he may have
under the Constitution and laws to close mills in areas where bloodshed
is like to occur and to proceed with qualified and representative
officials on both sides of this controversy to bring about peace, law,
and order in the State of Rhode Island.173
The Central Falls Common Council sent a similar resolution with the same demand –
shut down the Saylesville plant to avoid future bloodshed.174
With Saylesville now fully embroiled in virtual hand-to-hand combat, the
UTW leaders scrambled about what to do next. Sylvia demanded another audience
with Governor Green and General Dean returned from the front for the meeting.

171

“Soldiers, Driven Back by Rocks, Fire and Charge with Fixed Bayonets,” The Providence Journal,
September 12, 1934.
172
“Three of Mob Dying in Sayles Mill Riot,” The Providence Journal, September 13, 1934.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.

64

There is no record of what was said in their conference, but as the rioting intensified in
Saylesville, Governor Green issued an order to be read on the streets. The
responsibility fell to Central Falls Police Lt. Joseph Chaput, who read the following
statement from the governor to the crowd assembled at Dexter and Lonsdale:
I do hereby charge and command all people who are unlawfully,
riotously or tumultuously assembled anywhere in this State that they
immediately disperse and peaceably depart to their habitations, under
penalties inflicted by the laws of this state.175
The crowds did not disperse as ordered. With thousands of people still in the streets,
Governor Green once again took to the radio waves to plea for calm. At 8:15 that
evening, Green told the people of Rhode Island:
Believing that the bad feeling between the National Guard and the
strikers was in reality the result of a misunderstanding, I called a
conference this afternoon between high military officers and strike
leaders, and I am glad beyond words to say that the conference was
productive of good results and adjourned with an agreement with
regard to picketing which I trust may prove to be effective. Picketing
has been a great source of disagreement and violence.176
He also told the people of Rhode Island, that “I want to emphasize the point that this is
not an armistice between opposing forces.”
The pickets on the streets of Saylesville certainly did not recognize the
situation for an armistice, as they continued to harass the soldiers with rocks and other
projectiles. Shortly after the governor started his radio speech, the soldiers again
opened fire on the crowd. One boy, Fernand LaBreche, 17, of Central Falls, was shot
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near the heart. As LaBreche lay bleeding on the ground, a soldier came running up to
the line shouting to his comrades “Hold your fire, and agreement has been made
between the governor and other officials! There will be no more firing.” 177 This did
little to assuage the anger of the crowd. Central Falls patrolman Alfred Viau was hit
in the head with a rock and transported unconscious to Notre Dame Hospital. By 10:00
there were still thousands of people on the streets.178
Around 11:00, anti-aircraft lights were deployed in the yard of the plant to give
the soldiers a clearer picture of the battlefield. Seeking to establish cover, the pickets
put out the lights of any car that was traveling through the area. One driver who
refused to turn out his lights had his car seized and overturned by the pickets.179
Whether intentional or not, when Sylvia finally returned to the scene before midnight,
his car was bombarded with rocks and he was hit in the head. Sylvia, however,
recovered enough to issue the following statement:
I feel confident that if the United Textile Workers of America are not
victims again of broken promises that violence and disorder will not
reign again in Saylesville. Tonight, we assured Governor Green and
Adjt. General Dean that we will be willing to cooperate with their
military organization in keeping peace in the strike. This is the same
assurance that we gave Commanding Officer Dean last night when he
agreed to allow us to have pickets in five blocks of 20 under designated
captains properly identified, but this gentlemen’s agreement was
broken and as a result three are critically wounded and one is seriously
wounded. We sent one squad of ten pickets at 10 AM today to
determine the seriousness of ADJT. General Dean’s agreement. We did
not send the hundred, but we found drawn clubs and rifles in the hands
of the guardsmen. Although properly designated not a union striker
was allowed inside the rope lines that preceded the barbed wire
barricades. Then clubs were wielded, tear gas was hurled and shots
177
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were fired, the result of a broken agreement. If our pickets could do
their part there would be no bloodshed. School children would not have
been the object of stones or bullets or clubs if we had been allowed to
follow out the plan which we agreed to try at the suggestion of Adjutant
Dean.180

The people of Saylesville woke up the news that Charles Gorcynski
died from his wounds. There were no picketers anywhere to be found and the
National Guard troops took advantage of their absence to extend their
fortifications further down Lonsdale Avenue in both directions, erecting
barbed wire gateways on either end. Residents had to show identification to
come or go through the gates. Seventeen men who had been arrested by the
Guard over the last twenty-four hours were turned over to the Central Falls
police and transported to the 11th District Court in front of Judge Charles Risk.
Three of the men plead guilty to minor charges, two of whom were sentenced
to thirty days in jail, and one released after paying a fine. The other fourteen
pleaded innocent to the more serious charge of “riotous assembly.” Their
collective bond was set at $24,200. A few paid their portion of the bond, most
did not, and were held over for trial scheduled for September 25.181
The UTW organizers gathered for a morning meeting at the Labor Temple to
assess the situation. Adelard Gingras told reporters after the meeting the UTW had
appointed selected men to work with the Central Falls police to identify any radical
agitators who were in the area looking to cause trouble. Despite the increased Guard
fortifications and the union’s willingness to work with the police, a crowd of about
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500 people gathered in Quinn Square, near St. Mathieu’s church, around 3:00. After
being ordered to leave, police arrested three men from Providence who refused to
move. The show of force and the arrests dissuaded the crowd from any further action
and other than a small group of people approaching the Liberty Street guard gate in the
evening, all remained quiet.182
At 10:30 that morning, Governor Green received a call from President
Roosevelt. They discussed the situation in Rhode Island and the possible deployment
of federal troops to forestall any more violence. Governor Green described the call to
reporters:
President Roosevelt has just called me up, and I had a long and most
satisfying talk with him. I told him the length of the situation here, and
he showed remarkable knowledge of Rhode Island conditions. He said
he was getting in touch with Washington to have all information ready
and all preparations made to respond to any call for federal troops the
state might formally make in this emergency. He ended by saying that
he was heartily in back of me and would support me to the limit.183
Roosevelt’s office also issued a statement after the call, saying: “The President is in
complete and constant touch with the Rhode Island situation. It is, of course, hoped
that disorders caused by irresponsible and disorderly individuals will terminate before
nightfall.”184 After the call between the governor and the president it was reported
General Douglas MacArthur was beginning preparations to send federal troops to the
strike area and troop movements were noted across New England. Five hundred
soldiers of the 13th Infantry and the 66th Tank division were ordered to cancel
scheduled maneuvers and report immediately to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, an
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hour’s drive from Saylesville. Secretary of War George Dern was also reportedly on
his way to Rhode Island to arrive before President Roosevelt, who was scheduled to be
in Newport that weekend for an annual yacht race.185
Green also spoke that morning with Saylesville Finishing Plant lawyer Robert
B. Dresser. After the phone call, the Board of Directors for the Saylesville plant met
and voted to close the plant effective at 5:00 that evening. Later in the day, Dresser
made public a carefully worded letter to the press he had sent Green to confirm the
closing. It read in part:
Although we have had no strike, and have no dispute with our own
employees, who urgently need the employment which we are willing
and able to afford them if given protection in continued operation,
nevertheless, the board of directors conceives it as a duty in common
with that of all good citizens to cooperate to the fullest extent with you
as commander-in-chief of the state military force and as governor of the
State in meeting the crisis which you state has arisen.
Accordingly, we beg to state that we are complying with your request
and that our plant at Saylesville will be closed at 5 O’clock this
afternoon, when the day shift ends.186
Inside the plant, the company posted two separate notices to workers, telling them that
as the Commander and Chief of the State, the governor had ordered the plant
closed.187
As the drama subsided on the streets of Saylesville, it was just beginning at the
State House. Governor Green, concerned about the potential for continued violence,
called an emergency session of the Rhode Island General Assembly to consider a
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sweeping package of bills he claimed would allow him to take control of the situation.
He was aware although the use of federal troops was offered, it would take time for
those troops to mobilize and transport to Rhode Island. Therefore, he submitted
emergency legislation to the General Assembly doing four things: allocate an
additional $100,000 to the State Police to increase their ranks, allocate an additional
$100,000 to the National Guard so that they could deploy 1000 veterans immediately
to strike areas, allow the Governor to close any mills in the state by executive order,
and finally, declare a state of insurrection existed, empowering the governor to
formally request the federal troops.188
The governor prepared a statement for the members of the General Assembly
outlining his reasons for calling the special session. He wrote to them saying:
I have called you together here today, although you were to have met
tomorrow, because of a crisis in the affairs of State. We are face to
face now, not with a textile strike, but a communist uprising. What
started as local conflicts between employers and striking workers over
the question of picketing has grown and spread to other localities and
includes a large number of persons with no interest whatsoever in the
strike but seeking merely to create disorder, and some of them with the
deliberate plan to upset our established government. 189
He reviewed what actions his administration had taken so far to suppress this
“communist uprising” including replacing the deputy sheriffs with the State Police and
then supporting the State Police with the militia. He praised the actions of both, but
also acknowledged that thus far these steps had “proved inadequate” to the situation.
Therefore:
Due to the fact that some time will be required to select and place on
active duty additional members of the State Police and in order that
increased protection of our people and property by tonight, I have
188
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prepared for your consideration and passage legislation permitting this
state to take advantage of the provisions of the constitution of the
United States by calling for aid from the armed forces of the Federal
Government.190
The General Assembly was divided between a House of Representatives
controlled by Democrats and a Senate controlled by Republicans. Additionally, the
House majority was divided into two factions: one supporting fellow Democrat Green,
and another controlled by Pawtucket Democratic Party boss, and rival of Green,
Thomas McCoy. McCoy and Green spent years jousting for control of the Party and
at this stage of Green’s first term as governor, it was not clear who had the upper
hand.191
The special session started off in a spirit of bipartisanship, with the leaders in
both chambers agreeing to waive procedural rules so the governor’s proposals could
be given speedy consideration. But not long after the session began, Governor
Green’s proposals hit a snag. The Democratic Party caucus in the House, even after
the governor personally addressed them, called for tabling the measure calling for
federal troops and declaring a state of insurrection. They did support his other calls
for more money for the State Police and National Guard and giving him the authority
to close the mills.192
While initially signaling he would be willing to support the governor’s
proposals, after a party caucus in the Senate, Republican Senate Majority Leader
Bodwell told the governor he would not be able to support the measure giving the
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governor the authority to close any mills. Bodwell told the governor passing such a
bill would make Green a ‘tool of labor.’193 When the Senate convened later in the day,
Bodwell moved to divide the legislation into two separate measures - one concerning
the additional funds for the State Police and National Guard, the other addressing the
power to close the mills (it is unclear if the Senate ever took up the proposal to declare
a state of insurrection). Democratic Minority Leader Senator William Troy, who
verbally sparred with Bodwell at the outset of the strike, took to the floor of the Senate
and declared that Bodwell had broken his word to the governor on the measures.
Bodwell proceeded anyway with the motion to divide the question, which was
authorized by the majority. He then took to the floor to explain his support for the
measure for additional funds. He said:
Flames of communism and all that goes under the red banner threaten
the safety of our people and the security of their homes. An extreme
emergency exists. In such an emergency there is only one thing for
patriotic Americans to do, and that is to join wholeheartedly, genuinely
and completely in aiding the Chief Executive, in seeing that he is given
the tools required - it is not a question of what kind they should be - so
that the safety of our people and homes may be protected.194
Minority leader Troy implored his colleagues to pass both measures to no
avail. When the vote was taken on the divided measure the provision to support the
additional funding and manpower was approved unanimously but was 25-15,
following party lines, against the mill closing bill. The Rhode Island General
Assembly does not operate with a conference committee structure like the United
State Congress. Instead, for a bill to become law, it must first pass in both chambers,
with identical language, before it can be sent to the governor for signature or veto.
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However, the House had already adjourned for the day, meaning the measures would
need to wait until the next day, Friday, for consideration. 195
Although the House was adjourned, the Democratic Party again caucused
privately to decide what to do next on. The next day, when the House convened
shortly after 10:00 in the morning, the plan hatched in the caucus unfolded. House
Majority Leader Representative Edmund Flynn took to the floor and assigned the bill
to increase funding for the State Police and the National Guard to the House Finance
committee, as is customary protocol. However, in a move catching Governor Green by
surprise, Flynn then made a motion to adjourn. The motion was seconded by
Representative Patrick McAughey, an ally of the McCoy block in the House. While
members of the House aligned with the governor protested the move, the vote to
adjournment was approved, effectively killing all of Green’s proposals. With no
legislation before them, the Senate followed the House and adjourned shortly after
1:30 that afternoon.196
A chastened Governor Green called the press to his office in the State House
and issued the following statement:
I am very much disappointed that the House Finance Committee did
not report the bill passed by the Senate which would have increased the
State Police appropriation during this emergency. I was informed
yesterday that certain influences in the House, which continuously have
hindered legislation which I have sponsored killed this measure.
Certain members of the House have informed me just what the motives
of this group are. When the National Guard is withdrawn from the
strike areas, which I hope will be soon, some force will have to be in
readiness to augment the local police forces. The State Police are doing
well to maintain their share of the work at the present time They will
need assistance then. The responsibility for killing this act will lie with
this group of men who I have heard before have continually blocked
195
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efforts to pass legislation that I believe to be necessary. Petty personal
grievances should be overlooked at this time of great emergency. 197

The action at the State House was not the only drama for the day. A bomb
scare during the day raised concerns the situation was about to turn explosive. Police
reported twenty-five sticks of dynamite were stolen from the St. James Cemetery in
the Manville neighborhood of Lincoln. The Pawtucket Times claimed the theft was
part of a communist plot to blow up the Diamond Hill Reservoir on the
Cumberland/Lincoln border. Cumberland Police officer James Bradley told reporters
he was contacted by residents living near the Arnold Mill complex about three cars
suspiciously parked nearby so he and members of the State Police stood guard by a
dam near the reservoir. Despite attributing the theft of dynamite to a “communist
plot” there is no evidence to support the claim and there never was any explosion.198
Just before the General Assembly began its special session, Governor Green
sent a telegram to every police department in the state to round up all known
communists.199 The order was the culmination of a campaign, led by the governor and
supported by both the UTW, the police, and the press, to blame the disorder on the
communists. Earlier in the week, police arrested nine men from Boston outside of the
Roger Williams Furniture Company on Pearl Street in Providence. The men were
affiliated with a union named the Independent Furniture Workers Union and detained
after a search of their car revealed they had a night stick and a rubber hose, presumed
by the police to be weapons. When the police took the men back to the police station
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for questioning, they contacted the Boston Police Department’s “Radical Squad” who
informed them the union the men were affiliated with was “of a distinctively radical
nature” and the men were “reds.” When a lawyer from Boston, Louis Gurman, arrived
at the police station to secure bail for the men, he too was detained until the “Radical
Squad” in Boston confirmed his status as a lawyer.200
Police also told reporters they were tracking the movements of another known
radical, a Brooklyn, New York, woman named Ida Alter, who was seen talking to
workers in the Olneyville factory area. They referred to Alter as “an inflammatory
talker and to be possessed of more education that the ordinary mill worker.” Police
believed she was associated with UTW organizer William Clark. The Police told
reporters ``We have not connected any of these people with any communistic
organization. We know, however, that some of them have decidedly radical
tendencies. What develops later remains to be seen.”201
What developed later was a raid on the Communist Party headquarters at 447
Westminster Street, Providence, around midday on September 13. Police seized a
truck containing more than a ton of paraphernalia and pamphlets, including 1000
copies of The Daily Worker. Six people were immediately taken into custody and a
dozen more arrested later that day, including Lawrence Spitz, one of the men who
disrupted the Labor Day speeches earlier in the month. According to police, the “reds”
were organizing a march on the State House because inside the office on Westminster
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Street they found a mimeograph machine and thousands of flyers with the following
message printed on them:
Fellow workers: Today at the state legislature, the General Assembly is
called into special session by Governor Green, who will ask for
$100,000 to increase the State Police force to 500. NOT ENOUGH
BLOOD is on the governor’s hands yet - he wants more forces with
which to attack the workers. TODAY- the workers must give their
answer to the outrageous criminal shootings. TODAY - we must make
the mill owners’ agents who sit in the State House respect the workers’
right their usual MASS PICKETS. On this depends the success or
failure of the strike. This is a matter of bread and butter - OF LIFE
AND DEATH. 202
Upon hearing the news of the arrests, Sylvia issued a public statement on
behalf of the UTW:
After receiving reports from field workers who were on the scene in
both Saylesville and Woonsocket last night, when serious uprisings
occurred, resulting in one man being slain and many wounded, the
Rhode Island strike committee today went on record advising workers
not to tolerate or have anything to do with communists who have
invaded the Blackstone Valley strike area. Reports from these same
field workers have convinced us that communists imported into the
strike area from New York, Boston, Lawrence, and Providence were
solely responsible for the uprisings that took place both in Saylesville
and Woonsocket.
Communists, known for their extreme radical tendencies, and including
some of the prominent leaders of that group, were active in both the
Central Falls and Woonsocket disorders. It is our intention as members
of the Rhode Island Strike Committee that the strike will continue in a
peaceful manner, and, towards this end, we urge all members of the
United Textile Workers of American to rid themselves of communists
and their activities.203
In response to the raids, the Communist Party-affiliated International Labor
Defense sent a telegram to the General Assembly, demanding Governor Green be
impeached for using the raids to stifle the rights of workers to organize and for
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ordering “cold-blooded shooting, clubbing, wounding and gassing of hundreds of
these workers by National Guards, and has deputized gun-thugs.”204 There is no record
of the telegram even being received, never mind read, by any member of the
Assembly. Of all of those arrested during the roundup, only one person, Irving Kaitz,
admitted to being present in the Saylesville area, and he claimed his involvement was
limited to throwing fourteen rocks in one of the melees. At the trial for the arrested
communists on October 2, prosecutors presented no evidence any of the other
arrestees were involved in the strike disturbances. Only Kaitz was convicted on a riot
charge while the others were convicted of petty crimes such as vagrancy.205
With the shutdown of the Saylesville mill, the closing of the chaotic special
session of the General Assembly, and a roundup of suspected “reds,” Sylvia called a
meeting of UTW leaders to discuss next steps. The meeting took place at 9:00 Friday
evening at the UTW union hall at 23 Broad Street in Pawtucket. The group was
smaller than usual, which is probably why it took place here instead of at the general
strike headquarters at the Labor Temple. Despite purportedly being a “secret” meeting,
the press was waiting for Sylvia to arrive. He told reporters: “we have made enough
headway here so that there’s nothing to amount to anything in operation in Rhode
Island. The State is tied up. And it will remain tied up until the mills settle with us.”
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THE AFTERMATH
The following Sunday, September 16, Charles Gorcynski was buried in Notre
Dame Cemetery. Thousands of people marched behind the funeral cortege following
services at St. James Polish Catholic Church in Central Falls. The quiet on the streets
of Saylesville held while the mill remained closed. But if Sylvia’s claims that the
mills were “tied up” it was surely with loose bonds, because on September 18, the
Saylesville plant announced it would be reopening.206 By agreement between the
UTW and the governor, picketing was allowed at the facility, but the union was
limited to having only 140 people on the lines at any time. They divided their
numbers into seven groups of twenty, and they paraded in front of the facility, from
Walker Street to Smithfield Ave. Although some employees of the bleachery reported
their houses were hit with rocks the night before the re-opening of the facility, there
were no disturbances at the bleachery itself and nearly all the Sayles workforce
reported for duty as scheduled.207
As other mills across Rhode Island began to resume operations, a commission
appointed by President Roosevelt prepared to release a report on the national strike. A
three-person commission, originally appointed by the President on September 5, was
chaired by former Republican governor of New Hampshire John Winant. The Winant
Commission originally tried to arbitrate the dispute after Gorman made that
recommendation on September 8. Sloan from the textile employers group rejected the
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idea outright on September 9; so Winant instead investigated the UTW’s claims about
poor working conditions in the industry.208
On September 20, the commission released its findings. President Roosevelt
said “The excellent report of the Board of Inquiry for the cotton textile industry
presents findings and recommendations which cover the basic sources of difficulties,
and does this in a way which shows the wholly fair and reasonable approach which the
board undertook its task.”209 He then urged an end to the strike, saying “ I want to
express the very sincere hope that all employees now on strike will return to work and
that all textile manufacturers will aid the government in carrying out the steps
outlined,” in the Winant Commission’s report.210
Among the commission’s recommendations were a directive to the Federal
Department of Labor to do a statistical analysis of the union’s claims about poor
working conditions and a directive to the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the
economic status of the industry. The Commission then directed the agencies to report
their findings to the President so he could make recommendations for wage
adjustments for the workers.211 Winant’s report also made it clear the textile
employers refused to arbitrate the dispute even though the union was willing to do so.
The report was also critical of the textile industry’s self-appointed NRA Code
enforcement committee. The report cited them for creating “widespread
dissatisfaction” by using management representatives to investigate complaints by
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labor against management which “cannot be defended from any standpoint consistent
with the principles upon which the Recovery Act is founded.”212
UTW leader Francis Gorman was elated with the report, considering it a
complete vindication of the union’s decision to strike. Gorman told reporters:
By the President’s order a copy of the report of the Winant board was
presented to us tonight at the same hour the report was given to the
newspapers. It is impossible to digest in a few moments the contents of
a report so voluminous. My only comment at this time is that so far as
I now understand the report, it is an indictment of management and
indicates that the position of the union has been right.213
When asked if this meant the strike was over, Gorman answered: “Until the executive
council decides otherwise the strike will and must continue in full force.” He then
announced he was calling the executive council together immediately to consider
whether to call off the strike.214
On September 22, the members of the UTW executive council met at union
headquarters in Washington, DC, and formally voted to end the strike. AFL President
William Green, who attended the executive council meeting, told reporters “It’s a
victory for the workers. The position of the textile workers has been completely
vindicated.” Strike leader Gorman, reporting the vote to end the strike was voted
unanimously by the executive council, declared “our strike has torn apart the whole
unjust structure of (the) NRA.” He telegraphed every local union in the country,
announcing “your heroic strike ends in complete victory.”215
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The textile industry received the report with a shrug. George Sloan announced
the industry group would give the Winant Commission’s report “serious
consideration”, but they never formally acted on any of its recommendations.216
Across the country, workers took down their picket lines and began the process of
reporting to work to restart the mills.
In Rhode Island, plants not yet open began reactivating and workers
reporting for work. At the Saylesville bleachery, management compiled lists of those
arrested in the disturbances, thirty-seven people in total. The list includes the
arrestee’s names, ages, gender, and addresses. Whether or not this list was to serve as
a “blacklist” - workers not to be employed by the facility - is unclear.217 While some
minor jousting between the union and employers about who should be reporting to
work and when surfaced, the process generally proceeded without major controversy.
On October 6, the Rhode Island AFL met in Newport, Rhode Island, for its
annual convention. The delegates were greeted by Mayor Mortimer Sullivan and apart
from a delayed start as delegates made their way from across the state to Newport, the
convention got underway with high spirits. However, a controversy erupted on the
first day when Rob Hill, a delegate from Carpenters Local 94, submitted to the
resolutions committee a resolution condemning Governor Green for his actions during
the strike. Hill took to the floor after formally submitting the resolution, reading it
along with a statement to the convention:
As always when troops are used for police duty, lives were lost and
many people were injured. Had the strikers been allowed to picket the
mills, as is their right, the necessity for calling the troops would not
have occurred. It was the refusal of those in control to allow the
216
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strikers to picket the plants that caused the trouble. As proof of this, no
disturbance of any consequence took place after this right was
recognized. Charging that the disturbance was caused by communists,
the governor copying the methods of the dictators of Europe, issued an
order calling for the arrest of all known communists. According to the
report in the press, 17 persons were arrested but the charge of rioting
was placed against one person only. The others were charged with
being idle persons. The police were unable to get sufficient evidence to
connect them to the strike. The governor is a candidate for re-election
next November, but should be retired to private life for his actions
during the strike, Therefore, be it:
Resolved - WE, the delegates to the semi-annual convention of the
Rhode Island State Branch of the American Federation of Labor, call
upon all workers of the State to vote against the re-election of Governor
Theodore Francis Green as Governor of the State of Rhode Island.218
Green’s election was scheduled for the next month, November 1934. After Hill’s
speech, the UTW’s McMahon addressed the delegates. He thanked them for their
support in the strike, especially for their financial support, which he assured them the
money was well spent. Joseph Sylvia then took to the floor and told the delegates he
placed no blame on Governor Green for what took place in the streets of Saylesville.
Instead, he placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Sheriff Andrews for
unleashing his deputy sheriffs on the picketers. Unbelievably, he told the audience that
Governor Green was not responsible for calling out the Guard and the picket lines had
been peaceful until “political powers of the state” had sent the sheriffs to the mills.219
The next day, the delegates debated Hill’s resolution for over two hours. Hill
spoke in favor, as did a delegate named Ganz, representing the Newport Machinists’
local union. Ganz focused his argument on the governor’s round up of alleged
communists, telling the audience “I am not a communist, but I respect their right to
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their opinions. Green had no more right to order their arrest than to order the arrest of
all labor leaders.” State AFL President William Connolly spoke against the resolution
from the floor, reminding the convention that the UTW leaders McMahon and Sylvia
both praised Governor Green for his actions during the strike. In a moment of
realpolitik, Connolly told the body, “If we pass this resolution, where are we going to
get off going to the State House for legislation with a Republican governor?”220
Hill’s resolution failed and the convention voted to endorse Governor Green’s
re-election. Governor Green was then introduced to address the convention. He
praised the Rhode Island labor movement for bringing forth labor leaders like
McMahon and Gorman. He told the delegates he heard no criticism of the State Police
or the National Guard during the strike but heard plenty of complaints against the
deputy sheriffs and said Andrews took his orders not from him, but from the
manufacturers. Green said:
Two years ago, I included your entire 11 suggestions in my party
platform and introduced bills in the legislature in their favor. If a more
liberal instead of reactionary group were in control of our state senate
they would have passed. I am proud of our Rhode Island labor and its
leaders, who have become national figures, such as Thomas McMahon
and Francis A. Gorman ...You have the answer in your power, the
ballot box. In closing I again assure you of my cooperation and will
welcome your suggestions.221
The convention did pass a resolution calling for a ban on the use of the
National Guard for use in labor strikes except in case of rioting or revolt. They also
passed a resolution against “communistic disorders” and called for a committee of
labor leaders to collect data on all communistic organizations and their activities. Prior
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to adjourning the convention also passed resolutions against the organizing of workers
along industrial lines in favor of the traditional craft union structure, and a resolution
instructing the executive council to consider organizing women teachers into a unit of
the American Federation of Teachers.222
William Blackwood died of his wounds the day after the convention. His
funeral took place at the First Baptist Church in Pawtucket the following Thursday,
and he was buried in the Ballou Cemetery in Cumberland, Rhode Island.223 There is
no record that the UTW acknowledged his passing and his grave, to this day, is
unmarked.
With the endorsement of organized labor secured, Governor Green
campaigned as Roosevelt’s man in Rhode Island. His opponent, Republican State
Senator Luke Callan, tried to paint the governor as a coward for calling out the
National Guard during the strike, but the message did not resonate with Rhode Island
voters. On election day, November 6, Governor Green was re-elected with fifty-seven
percent of the vote.
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Governor Green was scheduled to be inaugurated on January 1, 1935, but party
control of the Rhode Island General Assembly remained unresolved because the vote
counts in three senate districts were contested, with some alleging fraud. In what
came to be known as the “Bloodless Revolution,” on inauguration day, Green and
other Democratic Party leaders orchestrated, through a series of questionable
maneuvers, for the Democratic Party candidates to be declared the victors in each of
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the contested districts, giving the Democratic Party total control over the General
Assembly. Before the end of the day, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was replaced,
and the Republican Party controlled offices of High Sheriff, Providence Safety Board,
and Finance Commissioner eliminated. The Democratic Party established complete
hegemony over the levers of power in the state.225

225

Mathew J. Smith, “The Real McCoy,” Rhode Island History (Providence, Rhode Island), Vol. 32,
Number 3, August 1973.

85

CONCLUSION
The chapter in Richard Kelley’s book Nine Lives For Labor about the 1934
textiles strike is called “The Union That Wasn’t There.” In this chapter, Kelly
describes a worried Thomas McMahon being driven from a pre-strike meeting
repeatedly muttering under his breath “a million mouths to feed.” Faced with the
seemingly impossible task of leading a nationwide strike with a union that in recent
months didn’t even have enough printed membership cards to sign up all of the
workers who wished to join, the unrealistic expectations of the members of the union
undoubtedly caused McMahon to shudder. 226
Both nationally and in Rhode Island, the national textile strike of 1934 was a
failure. The union was completely unprepared to lead an operation on this scale and it
never should have called the strike. From the end of the UTW convention in New
York City in August 1934, through the duration of the strike, the operation lurched
from crisis to crisis. This was especially true in Rhode Island. In the UTW’s defense,
it is not surprising things would be chaotic given the context of a national strike in an
industry with less than complete union membership density. But even with the prestrike attention, most workers did not immediately answer the call to walk off their
jobs in Rhode Island. The first week of the strike evolved slowly, and even if we
discount both the owners claims of continued operating capacity and the union’s
counter claims of strike effectiveness, by the time Saylesville erupted it is probable as
many as half of the textile workers in the state were still tending their machines.
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The UTW’s command of the situation in Rhode Island was challenged in other
significant ways. Though they won the support of the local AFL early on, other
independent textile unions either ignored or reluctantly delayed the call to join the
strike. Sylvia had to explain to workers, seemingly through the management slanted
press, that when the UTW called for the strike of all textile workers, it meant in all the
connected industries, including bleacheries. The workers in those connected mills,
most of whom were not UTW members, did not receive the message in the way it was
intended, if at all. On the picket lines in Saylesville and elsewhere, the UTW had little
control over the people engaged in either rioting or picketing, were ignored by the
police and the people, and in many cases tried to distance themselves from the actual
events on the streets.
Given the UTW’s inept leadership of the strike in Rhode Island, it is highly
questionable what happened in Saylesville was because the UTW specifically targeted
that bleachery for closure. When the first pickets arrived at the Saylesville bleachery
on September 7, three days after the strike began, the plant was not the only bleachery
in the state still operating. While some bleacheries did close, several others were still
open, including the nearby Lincoln Bleachery and Dye Works of Lonsdale. The
Lonsdale operation was not as large as its neighbor in Saylesville, but with 600
workers, it was no small outfit. Once the violence erupted in Saylesville local media
turned their attention away from a running tally of what shops were open versus those
that were closed; so, it is unclear what happened next with the other bleacheries. But
despite the company’s insistence they were being targeted, a notion adopted by
Findlay and Salmond, it seems more coincidence than intentional.
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It is also clear Governor Green bumbled his way through the strike. He changed his
message about the strike on several occasions as he cast about for someone to blame for the
violence, switching from blaming the reactionaries, who did seem to have a role to play in
the violence, to the communists, who did not. The men under his authority did their best to
ignore him and the elected members of the General Assembly undercut his authority. It was
only by making common cause with the UTW and the labor movement after the strike was
over placing the blame on “communists” that Green’s reputation was spared.
This event was not a “communist uprising.” The record clearly demonstrates
even if certain members of the Communist Party were present on the streets of
Saylesville, they played no leadership role whatsoever in the action. Only one member
of the Community Party was ever charged in connection to the disorder. The raid at
the party headquarters on Westminster Street on September 13 is comically anticlimactic, happening when the communists were planning a rally to protect the
workers after the shooting stopped. As Secretary of War Dern said to reporters when
he was asked about the so-called communist uprising, “you must realize it’s a custom
now to blame the communists for a lot of things.”227
Likewise, it is clear the uprising in the streets was not caused by
“outsiders.” If you recall, UTW leaders like Sylvia pleaded with Governor Green not
to impose picketing restrictions, that they could operate the picket lines peacefully,
and that any trouble in Rhode Island was imported from other states. The facts,
however, make clear the vast majority involved on the streets were local people from
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the surrounding area. One person from Connecticut was arrested during the
disturbances in Saylesville, a few from the Boston area, but nearly everyone else
caught and charged by the police lived within walking distance of the Saylesville
bleachery. Similarly, according to the list of casualties, most of their addresses are
from the working class neighborhoods of Central Falls and Pawtucket.
Recall also how on the first day of violence in Saylesville, the UTW men who
were there, Brunelle and Powers, tried to keep a group of you boys from throwing
rocks at the plant and the sheriffs. In her interview with the University of Rhode
Island’s Mill Worker Oral History Project of the mid 1970’s, local resident Rachel
Landry told interviewers, when asked who was involved with the violence that it was
“young fellas, I guess.”228 When Rita Brouilette, the 16-year-old girl from nearby Etna
Street in Central Falls, was arrested by police, a wire service headline read “Just
Having Fun Arrested Rioters Declare.”229 A sensationalized headline for sure, but not
far from the mark.
What I believed happened on the streets of Saylesville was neighborhood riot
caused by armed thugs provoking local youths into doing something foolish, which
then escalated to the point of civil disorder. Following the timeline of events on
September 7 through 12, the flow of the action shows most of the violence started
between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 in the afternoon, just as local schools released
students, lulled around dinner time, and then resumed in the evening hours of late
summer when the sun was still out and temperatures still warm. The action attracted
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curiosity seekers, many of whom were likely strike-idled area workers, swelling the
size of the crowd providing cover for young people to keep the fight against the
sheriffs going.
The political establishment used the violence on the streets to stake out
positions serving their own needs, ascribing intentions fitting their own conclusions,
and when the action was over, created narratives to protect themselves. Governor
Green, mindful of how one of his predecessors lost re-election for mishandling a
textile strike, seized the opportunity to take credit for the end of the violence. The
Rhode Island labor movement, ascendent with newfound allies in the early days of the
New Deal, joined forces with Green and helped share his version of the story,
complete with communist bogeymen.
For further evidence for how quickly the people involved tried to bury the
story of the Saylesville Massacre, on January 30, 1935, the political establishment in
Rhode Island held a Gala Ball to celebrate FDR’s birthday at the Exchange Street
Armory in Providence, one of the mustering cites for the National Guard on their way
to Saylesville. UTW organizer Stella Moskwa was escorted to the event by Rhode
Island’s Lt. Governor Robert Quinn and crowned “Queen of the Ball” by Democratic
Party Boss Tom McCoy.230 The Democratic Party had much to celebrate. In addition
to surviving the strike, thanks to the maneuvering of McCoy and Green, the
Democratic Party took complete control of the political order in Rhode Island. Green
and McCoy’s coup in January of 1935 has come down to us known as the “Bloodless
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Revolution” only because it was convenient to all involved to forget as quickly as
possible the bloody deaths of Charles Gorcynski and William Blackwood.
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